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Steven A. Bank*
ABSTRACT

In response to an unprecedented crisis that has been called
"the World Cup of Fraud," the F6d6ration Internationale de
Football Association, or FIFA, has undertaken a series of reform
measures in the last several years. Most of these reforms have
focused on attempting to break the cycle of corruption among
football insiders by bringing in more outsiders, including
independent chairs of both the Ethics Committee and Audit and
Compliance Committee, as well as individuals to serve in
executive positions who had not previously been involved in the
sport at any level. Such an outsider-focused reform strategy takes
a page from the US corporategovernance playbook, which has
increasingly come to rely upon independent directorsas a way to
keep the interests of management insiders aligned with the
interests of shareholders.
This Article argues that, ratherthan focusing on bringingin
more outsiders, FIFA should harness the power of insiders. The
evidence is mixed as to whether independent directors are
effective in public corporations,but it is even less clear in the case
of nonprofit corporations where there are no stockholders to
which the independent directors report. This model is
particularly inappropriatein the case of FIFA, which does not
even have the donors or government oversight that arepresent in
US nonprofits. By contrast, FIFA insiders were instrumental in
spurringthe investigations that led to the US indictments in 2015

* Paul Hastings Professor of Business Law, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to
Leonora Cohen and Jonathan Simmons for their research assistance.
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against individuals for their participation in corruption and
fraud. These so-called whistleblowers had better access to
information and were more dedicated to FIFA's mission to foster
the development and growth of the sport than any outsiderwould
be, but they often came forward at great personal and
professional sacrifice to themselves. Not only could a
comprehensive program to incentivize insiders to come forward
and protect them from retaliationbegin to change the culture of
corruption in FIFA, but it could also serve as a model for
governance reform in internationalnonprofit organizationsmore
generally.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the World Cup in Russia dominated the headlines in the
summer of 2018, a black cloud remained over the Fidgration
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),' the tournament's

1.

In this Article, the terms "football" and "soccer" will be used interchangeably

(except where it is part of an organization's title), reflecting the fact that the sport is
called football in most countries abroad, but is called soccer in the United States.
Notwithstanding the cries of some fans that "soccer" is an inappropriately Americanized
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organizer and soccer's global governing authority. 2 In 2015, in what
has been called "the World Cup of Fraud," 3 more than forty individuals
associated with FIFA were indicted in the United States for fraud,
bribery, and money laundering involving hundreds of millions of
dollars. 4 An internal investigation by American law firm Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP reportedly uncovered evidence of
corruption that went far beyond the original indictments. 5 Former
FIFA president Joseph "Sepp" Blatter and former Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA) President Michel Platini, neither of
whom were named in the US indictments, were both suspended from
FIFA for ethics violations.6 Moreover, in both of the regional

name for a sport that is properly called football, it actually originated in England almost
150 years ago when a rules dispute led two groups in the Football Association to split
into different sports: Rugby and Association Football, the latter of which was later
shortened to "soccer" by an English captain. Uri Friedman, Why Americans Call Soccer
'Soccer', THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2014/06/why-we-call-soccer-soccer/372771/
[https://perma.cc/ZXP4-R4L3]
(archived Jan. 8, 2019).
2.
Sean Ingle, World Cup action must not divert from focus on further Fifa
corruption, THE GUARDIAN (June 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/football/
2018/jun/10/world-cup-2018-fifa-corruption-new-book-red-card
[https://perma.cc/7FCZ9B8NJ (archived Jan. 8, 2019). As if to remind soccer fans of the FIFA corruption scandal,
the release of several books was timed to occur right around the start of the World Cup.
See generally KEN BENSINGER, RED CARD: HOW THE U.S. BLEW THE WHISTLE ON THE
WORLD'S BIGGEST SPORTS SCANDAL (2018); BONITA MERSIADES, WHATEVER IT TAKES:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIFA WAY (2018).

3.
Eliott C. McLaughlin & Greg Botelho, FIFA corruptionprobe targets 'World
Cup
of
fraud,'
IRS
chief
says,
CNN
(May
28,
2015),
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/27/football/fifa-corruption-charges-justice-department/
[https://perma.cc/EXV2-D7HD] (archived Jan. 8, 2019) (quoting Richard Weber, chief of
the IRS Criminal Investigation Division).
4.
See generally Indictment, United States v. Webb, No. 1:15-CR-00252
(E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2015); Superseding Indictment (S-1), United States v. Webb, No.
1:15-CR-00252 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015); Superseding Indictment (S-2), United States
v. Webb, No. 1:15-CR-00252 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2017).
5.
A Hemisphere of Soccer Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (updated Dec. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/27/sports/soccer/fifaindictments.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cclWT4V-KZ3L]; Graham Dunbar et al., U.S.
indicts 16 more in probe of world soccer corruption, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Dec. 2,

2015),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/dec/02/report-fifa-officialsagain-subject-of-pre-dawn/ [https://perma.cc/BWT8-Y7GM] (archived Jan. 8, 2019);
Tariq Panja, FIFA's Internal Investigation Said to Uncover More Crimes, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-07/fifa-s-internalinvestigation-said-to-uncover- more-crimes [https://perma.cc/5DVU-UCXJ]
(archived
Jan. 8, 2019); Rebecca Ruiz et al., FIFA Corruption:Top Officials Arrested in Pre-Dawn
Raid
at
Zurich
Hotel,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
3,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/sports/fifa-scandal-arrests-in-switzerland.html
[https://perma.cc/CB33-5V3N] (archived Jan. 8, 2019).
6.
Owen Gibson, Sepp Blatterand Michel Platini banned from football for eight
years
by
Fifa,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
21,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/21/sepp-blatter-michel-platini-bannedfrom-football-fifa [https://perma.cc/FUY7-KSZ9] (archived Jan. 8, 2019); Panja, sz'pra
note 5. They were also subject to criminal investigation in both the U.S. and Switzerland.
Sam Borden, Sepp Blatter, FIFA President, FacesCriminal Investigation in Switzerland,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/sports/soccer/sepp-
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confederations governing soccer in the western hemisphere-the
Confederation of North, Central American, and Caribbean Association
South American Football
and the
(CONCACAF)
Football
Confederation (CONMEBOL)-three presidents in a row were indicted
7
and/or suspended for ethics violations. In an attempt to stem the
8
bleeding, FIFA quickly adopted a package of reform measures. These
followed closely on the heels of a previous reform effort that FIFA had
undertaken after allegations of corruption and bribery surrounding
Mohammed bin Hammam's failed campaign for FIFA president in
2011.9
What is FIFA's problem? The conventional wisdom has been that
it is too insular. As a result, reformers have pushed FIFA to bring in
more outsiders.1 0 As one observer noted,
[fjor decades its leadership has been drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of
the rich and powerful men who serve without term limits or transparency. If

FIFA is to have any chance at persuading the world that it's serious about reform
and rehabilitating its brand, the organization needs to embrace new leadership
11
and consider recruiting outside the football fraternity.

[https://perma.cc/8488-VT4E]
blatter-fifa-switzerland-criminal-proceedings.html
(archived Jan. 8, 2019). Platini claims he was cleared of criminal wrongdoing recently by
Switzerland. Bate Felix, Platinisays cleared by Swiss authorities,plans return, REUTERS
(May 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-fifa-platinilplatini-says[https://perma.cclR5QScleared-by-swiss-authorities-plans-return-idUKKCN1IRO8R
YM2M] (archived Jan. 8, 2019). Swiss authorities, however, claim that Platini has drawn
a "false interpretation" of the status of his investigation and reports that the
investigation of Blatter "is not definitively finished." Platinisays Swiss have clearedhim
of criminal wrongdoing, SWISSINFO (May 26, 2018), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/
society/corruption-probe-platini-says-swiss-have-cleared-him-of-criminalwrongdoing/44146908 [https://perma.ccX9GA-AZHV] (archived Jan. 8, 2019).
Dunbar et al., supra note 5.
7.
FIFA congress votes in favour of reform package, SKY SPORTS (Feb. 26, 2016),
8.
http://www.skysports.com/football/news/1 1095/10181905/fifa-congress-votes-in-favourof-reform-package [https://perma.cc/4GLL-GDCX] (archived Jan. 9, 2019). CONCACAF
and CONMEBOL adopted similar reform packages oftheir own. See Member Association
2016),
26,
(Feb.
CONCACAF
Reforms,
Statutes
Pass
https://www.concacaf.comlen/article/member-associations-pass-statutes-reforms
[https://perma.cclR88W-WZM8] (archived Jan. 19, 2019); see also CONMEBOL to reform
2016),
13,
(Sept.
SPORTS
YAHOO!
scandals,
graft
after
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/conmebol-reform-graft-scandals- 165852277--sow.html
[https://perma.cclNL2W-AMJ3] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
Roger Pielke, Jr., An Evaluation of the FIFA Governance Reform Process of
9.
2011-2013, in MANAGING THE FOOTBALL WORLD CUP 197 (Stephen Frawley & Daryl
Adair eds., 2014) [hereinafter Pielke Jr., An Evaluation of the FIFA Governance Reform
Process].

See Stefan Fatsis, Blatter'sResignation is Only the First Step, SLATE (June 3,
10.
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports-nut/2015/06/sepp-blatter-resigns.
2015),
[https://perma.cc/W7K2-64E2]
fifamust-cleanhouse to end corruption.html
(archived Jan. 9, 2019).
MARY PAPENFUSS & TERI THOMPSON, AMERICAN HUCKSTER: How CHUCK
11.
BLAZER GOT RICH FROM-AND SOLD OUT-THE MOST POWERFUL CABAL IN WORLD

SPORTS 212 (2016) (quoting Donna de Varona, a US gold medalist in swimming and
former president of the Women's Sports Federation).
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The theory is that an outsider should march into FIFA offices,
"presumably with rubber gloves and bleach," and "clean the place out,
with fresh elections, new executives, and new rules."1 2
Given these views, it should not be surprising that one of the
central features of FIFA's reform plans has been to increase the
number of outsiders in key positions.' 3 FIFA created an Ethics
Committee and an Audit and Compliance Committee, each headed by
an independent chair and staffed with members unaffiliated with any
other FIFA body.1 4 It also mandated that at least half of the members
of a number of committees, including the Governance, Review,
Finance, and Development Committees, and the Compensation
Subcommittee of Audit and Compliance, be comprised of members
deemed to be independent under FIFA rules.15 This is in addition to
the requirement that FIFA itself be subject to audits by external
auditors who are considered independent under Swiss law.16
Consistent with the outsider focus of these reforms, Gianni Infantino,
FIFA's president, appointed Fatma Samoura, someone with no ties to
the sport at all, to the position of secretary-general of FIFA.' 7 In
announcing her appointment, Infantino praised the fact that Samoura
"will bring a fresh wind to FIFA-somebody from outside not somebody
from inside, not somebody from the past. Somebody new, somebody
who can help us do the right thing in the future."' 8
This push for more independent oversight is straight out of the
pages of the US corporate governance reform playbook. For years,
increasing the number of outside directors has been a go-to reform in
the context of publicly held corporations.'" Some studies have shown

12.
John Leicester, In FIFA crisis, politicians must turn up the heat for change,
SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 2, 2015) https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-in-fifacrisis-politicians-must-turn-up-the-heat-2015oct02-story.html
[https://perma.cc/4PPDPMNA] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
13.
See Steven A. Bank, Reforming FIFA From The Inside Out, OXFORD Bus. LAw
BLOG
(July
11,
2018),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-lawblog/blog/2018/07/reforming-fifa-inside-out [https:/perma.cc/6QQK-QDY2]
(archived
Jan. 19, 2019) ("Most of these [recent reform measures] have focused on attempting to
break the cycle of corruption among football insiders by bringing in more outsiders.").
14.
FIFA, FIFA CODE
OF ETHICS: 2012 EDITION § 34 (2012),
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/82/codeofethics
v
211015_e_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/PXR4-MM2Y] (archived Jan. 27, 2019); FIFA,
FIFA
GOVERNANCE
REGULATIONS
§
37
(2016),
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/bodies/02/76/71/35/20160226_gover
nanceregulations-enneutral.pdf[https://perma.cc/ZVK9-EZ5S] (archived Jan. 27, 2019)
[hereinafter FIFA Governance Regulations].
15.
FIFA Governance Regulations, supra note 14, §§ 26-28, 37(11).
16.
Id. § 39.
17.
FIFA appoint Fatma Samoura as first female secretary general, ESPN (May
13, 2016), http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/post/2872047/fifa-appoint-fatma-samouraas-first female-secretary-general [https://perma.cclUK9A-9JTL] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
18.
Id.
19.

See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 217-30

(2002) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE CORPORATION] (describing the history of reform efforts
aimed at requiring independent directors); Harald Baum, The Rise of the Independent
Director: A Historical and Comparative Perspective 2 (Max Planck Institute for
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that they help guard against the kind of managerial expropriation that
can occur when shareholders are too numerous and dispersed to
monitor the managers themselves,2 0 although others point out that
21
they also face some unique disincentives to investigate.
Even if outside directors may be beneficial in public corporations,
they have not had much of an effect as of yet in FIFA. While problems
relating to the old regime continue to surface, such as excessive
22
compensation arrangements for former executives, disclosures from
the Panama Papers that officials may have used transactions to funnel
23
ill-gotten funds through offshore accounts, and fresh revelations of
24
new problems have
corruption among old-guard football officials,
emerged.
In 2016, Infantino was subject to investigation for ethics violations
of his own after reports surfaced that he had ordered the destruction
of tapes of a FIFA Council meeting, made lavish expenditures without

Comparative and International Private Law Research Paper Series No. 16/20, 2016)
("Over the last decades, the primary legislative and judicial response to almost every
major corporate scandal in the U.S. has been to increase reliance on independent
directors.").

Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
20.
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465,
1468 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon Rise]; see also Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, Who's
Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect Shareholders'Interests?,40 FIN.
REV. 155, 171 (2005); Mark S. Beasley, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Relation Between
the Board of DirectorComposition and FinancialStatement Fraud, 71 AccT. REV. 443,
445 (1996); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separationof Ownership and

Control, 2 J.L. & ECON. 301, 315 (1983).
Quinn D. Curtis & Justin J. Hopkins, Do Career Concerns Create Incentives
21.
for Independent Directors to Monitor Executives? 19 (June 25, 2017) (unpublished
paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2800008 [https://perma.cc/
T3TC-VERW] (archived Jan. 27, 2019); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

IN THEORY

AND PRACTICE

192-93

(2008)

[hereinafter

BAINBRIDGE NEW CORPORATE] (describing some of the factors impeding independent
directors).
See Former FIFA chiefs embroiled in £55m compensation scandal, EXPRESS
22.
(June 4, 2016), http://www.express.co.uk/sport/football/676721/Former-FIFA-Chiefs[https://perma.cc/E763Embroiled-55m-Compensation-Scandal-Sepp-Blatter-News
V2K4] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
Rebecca Ruiz, After PanamaPapers,A Raid at UEFA and New Questions for
23.
FIFA, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/sports/soccer/
[https://perma.cc/EXS8-KBXS]
panama-papers-raise-new-questions-for-fifa.htm1
(archived Jan. 9, 2019).
See FIFA bans Ghana football head Kwesi Nyantakyi over 'cash gift', BBC
24.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44414780
2018),
8,
(June
[https://perma.cc/P3AP-U22Q] (archived Jan. 9, 2019) (saying FIFA Council member and
Ghana Football Association president Kwesi Nyantakyi suspended for taking $65,000
from an undercover reporter posing as a businessman); Graham Dunbar, FIFA audit
official admits bribery in US federal probe, AP NEWS (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://apnews.com/fb9300dfO8f84aeaa7eaO56a2f46fad [https://perma.cclH9BC-LWU4]
(archived Jan. 9, 2019) (saying Richard Lai of Guam, a member of the Audit and
Compliance Committee, admitted to taking more than $1 million in bribes); Raphael
Minder, Top Spanish Soccer Official Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2017, at B11 (Angel
Maria Villar, Spanish FA President and a Vice President at FIFA, was arrested for fraud
involving the Spanish national team).
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authorization, and improperly attempted to influence the election of
the next UEFA president. 25 Although ultimately cleared of some of
those accusations, 26 perhaps the more serious concern is that Infantino
pushed through a resolution that would enable the council to remove
members of FIFA's supposedly independent committees.2 7 This led
Dominic Scala, the chairman of the Audit and Compliance Committee,
to resign, and has called into question the independence of these
committees. 28 Indeed, some have suggested that Infantino was cleared
because Ethics Committee members were worried that they would be
replaced on the committee if they voted otherwise, 29 an event that
came to pass anyway when FIFA subsequently ousted the chairs of the
investigatory and adjudicatory branches of the Ethics Committee and
the chair of the Governance Committee,3 0 prompting several
remaining members of these committees to resign in protest.3 1 FIFA's

25.
FIFA,

Paul Nicholson, Infantino expense details unveil a new culture of spending at
INSIDE

WORLD

FOOTBALL

(June

9,

2016),

http://www.insideworldfootball.com/2016/06/09/infantino-expense-details-unveils-newculture-spending-fifal [https://perma.cc/R26W-SJ4L] (archived Jan. 9, 2019); Jaime
Rainbow, Report claims Infantino violated Fifa ethics code, WORLD SOCCER (July 20,
2016),
http://www.worldsoccer.com/news/report-claims-infantino-violated-fifa-ethicscode-383852 [https://perma.cclR26W-SJ4L] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
26.
The Investigatory Chamber reviewed certain flights Infantino took on a
private jet to determine if there was a conflict of interest and found none. FIFA President
GianniInfantino cleared after ethics committee investigation, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 5, 2016),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/palarticle-3725313/FIFA-president-Gianni-Infantinocleared-ethics-committee-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/D5DS-KFUJ] (archived
Jan. 9, 2019).
27.
See Owen Gibson, Fifa's independent audit committee chairman resigns in
protest

at

reforms,

THE

GUARDIAN

(May

14,

2016),

https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/may/14/domenico-scala-fifa-auditor-resignsprotest [https://perma.cc/MN44-HDEV] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
28.
Andrew Warshaw, Scala quits FIFA as Infantino hammers through an end to
'independent'

ethics,

INSIDE

WORLD

FOOTBALL

(June

9,

2016),

http://www.insideworldfootball.com/2016/05/14/scala-quits-fifa-infantino-hammers-endindependent-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/ECY8-XQHJ] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
29.
Andrew Warshaw, FIFA's double standards. It's what we call reform, INSIDE
WORLD FOOTBALL (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.insideworldfootball.com/2016/08/09/
andrew-warshaw-fifas-double-standards-call-reform/
[https://perma.cc/YF7P-DNUV]
(archived Jan. 9, 2019).
30.
Murad Ahmed, FIFA Ousts Governance Chief in "Nightof Long Knives," FIN.
TIMES
(May
9,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/79ed66e2-3504-1 1e7-bce49023f8cOfd2e (subscription required) [https://perma.cc/D4FA-96L2] (archived Jan. 9,
2019). Reportedly, at the time the committee chairs were ousted, the Ethics Committee
was actually investigating Infantino regarding fresh allegations of under-declaring the
amount of money he spent on his election campaign and trying to influence the election
of the new Confederation of African Football president. David Conn, Fifa ethics
committee was investigating Gianni Infantino over election expenses, THE GUARDIAN

(July 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/jul/2 1/fifa-investigatinggianni-infantino-election-expenses
[https://perma.cc/G5Y7-VYST] (archived Jan. 9,
2019).
31.
Tariq Panja, FIFA Watchdogs Quit in Protest, Sparking New Soccer Crisis,
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.comlnews/articles/2017-0517/more-fifa-watchdogs-quit-in-protest-sparking-new-soccer-crisis
[https://perma.cc/4RJE-N6S9] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
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32
long-standing auditor, KPMG, also resigned with immediate effect,
citing a lack of "trust that the new management would do what they
33
said they were going to do to improve governance."
In 2017, the Council of Europe launched an investigation of FIFA
on the grounds that "new FIFA management under Gianni Infantino
34
has made little effort to overhaul the scandal-ridden football body."
In its report, it concluded that FIFA's reform efforts might have made
35
sense on paper, but failed in their implementation. Indeed, according
to the Council of Europe's chief investigator, the new chair of FIFA's
Ethics Committee may have failed to disclose her ties to one of the
36
former FIFA officials who had pled guilty to corruption charges.
Infantino's apparent response was to propose changes that would gut
the reforms even further, creating a Bureau of the FIFA Council that
would replicate the old Executive Committee and removing the one
37
fully independent member of the Compensation Subcommittee. As
one reporter observed, even after all the upheaval of the last few years,
38
"FIFA remains more or less unchanged."
This Article argues that the fundamental problem with FIFA is
not so much its insularity as its lack of accountability. FIFA, along with
the International Olympic Committee and sixty or more other sports
organizations, is headquartered in Switzerland and organized as a

&

Auditor,
Harriet Agnew & Mura Ahmed, KPMG Switzerland Resigns as FIFA
32.
6
FIN. TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a872af30-31 e-11e6-bdaO04585c31bl53.html#axzz4BTfm4lQg (subscription required) [https://perma.cclBYQ679BN] (archived Jan. 9, 2019).
Murad Ahmed et al., KPMG Quits FIFA Over Reform Programme Doubts,
33.
FIN. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://next.ft.comcontent/0de97f98-360f-11e6-9a5(subscription
82a9bl5a8ee7?ftcamp=publishedlinks/rss/companies/feed//product
required) [https://perma.ccL98A-9M5X] (archived Jan. 19, 2019); John Letzing
Joshua Robinson, Auditor Raised Issues With FIFA Before Resigning, WALL ST. J. (June
19, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/auditor-raised-issues-with-fifa-before-resigning1466380050 [https://perma.cc/C8CC-L9AY] (archived Jan. 10, 2019).
FIFA under Scrutiny from anti-corruptionbody, SWlSSINFO (Feb. 15, 2017),
34.
http://www.swissinfo.chleng/society/good-governancefifa-under-scrutiny-from-anti[https://perma.cclGD9L-CU7V]
corruption-body/42962306#.WKSnfl31zyQ.twitter
(archived Jan. 10, 2019).
Tariq Panja, Report into FIFA Raises Questions about Ethics Investigator,
35.
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/08/sports/soccer/fifaethics.html [https://perma.cc/G84M-B7DL] (archived Jan. 10, 2019).
Id.
36.
Keir Radnidge, Infantino planning power grab at FIFA congress, WORLD
37.
9 74
18
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nonprofit Swiss association.3 9 A nonprofit can still earn profits in the

sense of earning revenues in excess of expenses, but it has no
stockholders. Even though outsiders can theoretically watch insiders
to guard against abuse, 40 no one watches the outsiders in a nonprofit
except perhaps donors in organizations that, unlike FIFA, rely upon
them. The United States has attempted to address this conundrum for
nonprofits through external regulation by state attorneys general and
federal tax authorities. 4 ' The oversight of FIFA, however, by Swiss
authorities is still relatively lax and ineffective, 42 notwithstanding
recent legislation to address that.43 Sponsors sometimes do provide a
measure of oversight, but they are often not committed to it and, even
if they are, others are more than happy to take their place. 4 4 The
closest analogues to stockholders are member nations that comprise
the congress that theoretically oversees the FIFA Council. Member
nations, however, are ill-equipped to serve in a monitoring role against
corruption. Many are themselves corrupt or woefully disorganized. 4 5
For those that are not, FIFA's ability to favor or punish one individual
member nation or region over others with respect to hosting rights or

39.
DAVID CONN, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF FIFA: THE MULTIMILLION- DOLLAR
CORRUPTION AT THE HEART OF GLOBAL SOCCER 29 (2017); Rebecca R. Ruiz, Swiss City Is

'the Silicon Valley of Sports,' N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 2016, at Dl.
40.
But see Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit
Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 86 (2007) (suggesting that while outsiders
may provide internal accountability in a nonprofit organization, it is not clear that this
is very effective or efficient).
41.
For a general discussion of federal and state regulation of nonprofits in the
U.S., see John A. Edie, Good and Not So Good Governance of Nonprofit Organizations:
FactualObservationsfrom the USA, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NON-

PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 20-38 (Klaus J. Hopt & Thomas von Hippel eds., 2010); MARION
R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
AND REGULATION (2008).

42.
See, e.g., Swiss decline to tighten corruptionlaws excessively, SWISSINFO (June
3,
2015),
http://www.swissinfo.chleng/-lex-fifa-_swiss-decline-to-tighten-corruptionlaws-excessively/41468372 [https://perma.cc/79LZ-SGT8] (archived Jan. 10, 2019)
("Critics say the cabinet's original proposal, nicknamed 'Lex Fifa,' has been watered
down.").
43.
Katharina Bart, Swiss to increase oversight of FIFA, other sports bodies,
REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-fifa-switzerlandidUKKCNOJJ1IQ20141205 [https://perma.cclULH8-SJW4] (archived Jan. 10, 2019);
Simon Bradley, Swiss move to show corruption a red card, SWISSINFO (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.swissinfo.chleng/house-in-order-swiss-move-to-show-corruption-a-red-

card/34066532 [https://perma.ce/FXJ9-K8LR] (archived Jan. 10, 2019).
44.
ALAN TOMLINSON, FIFA (FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE
ASSOCIATIONS): THE MEN, THE MYTHS, AND THE MONEY 152-54 (2014).

45.
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Given FIFA's fundamental lack of accountability, it is not
surprising that the reforms enacted to date appear to have been
relatively ineffective. They are an attempt to apply public company
governance regulations to a nonprofit organizational structure. In the
public company environment, outside directors are traditionally
47
considered to be a check against managers. Outsiders are potentially
useful in this case because they are "disinterested," in the sense that
unlike managers they do not work for the company and therefore are
able to approach potential conflict situations, such as awards of
executive compensation and decisions whether to pursue change-incontrol transactions, with a neutral perspective. Perhaps most
importantly, outsiders are approved by and accountable to
48
stockholders. Of course, they can be co-opted by insiders, but there is
at least some hope they will guard against abuse because they can be
removed by stockholders if they fail in this task.
One of the conceptual problems with relying on outsiders to reform
FIFA is that it assumes the problem with the organization is limited
to a "few bad apples." 49 Replace the bad apples and solve the problem.
If the problem is more pervasive, though, then the outsiders will have
difficulty making much of a difference. Indeed, in an environment
where bribery and corruption are the norm, a person's status as an
outsider in the sense of not being a long-time member of FIFA does not
mean much. A disinterested party can quickly become interested
without a change in their formal status if they are enticed to
participate in the corruption. The above-the-table payments to
committee members, which include exorbitant salaries, lavish per
diems, and stays at luxury hotels, might alone be enough to sap the
50
most ardent outside reformer of his or her will to resist.
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47.
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BAINBRIDGE NEW CORPORATE, supra note 21, at 193.

See Martin Painter, Can FIFA Reform Itself?, ASIA & THE PAC. POLICY SOC'Y
49.
APps POLICY FORUM (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.policyforum.net/can-fifa-reform-itselfl
[https://perma.cc/53K6-FKCC] (archived Jan. 10, 2019) ("For many years, Blatter's
strategy to ward off calls for anti-corruption reform was to blame the 'few bad apples'; to
claim 'bias' in the western media; and above all to reinforce his own position with the
organization with more deals and hand-outs.").
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50.
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Even if an independent member of a FIFA committee remains free
of inappropriate influences, FIFA's long-standing aversion to outsiders
hampers their influence. Throughout its history, FIFA has acted like
an autonomous nation, imposing its own rules rather than bowing to
the rules of others.5 1 For example, as a condition of naming it host of
the 2014 World Cup, FIFA forced Brazil to adopt a "World Cup Beer
Law" during the tournament, which relaxed its normal prohibition on
alcohol sales during games. 5 2 More generally, FIFA operates under a

policy that prohibits "governmental interference" and it often suspends
or threatens to suspend football associations from international play
when their national governments attempt to regulate those
associations in a way that displeases FIFA.5 3 When bad things happen,
FIFA executives tend to blame outsiders like the media, 54 much like
former members of the Confederacy blamed unrest during
Reconstruction on Northern "carpetbaggers."55 And even when it does
act, FIFA prefers to do so itself. After one crisis in 2011, Blatter
responded to calls for reform by insisting "these difficulties will be

of His Own] (describing how FIFA Executive Committee members receive $300,000 in
compensation, $500 per diems, first class flights and five star hotels and even relatively
minor committee members get $350 per diems and business class flights and all
expenses, which could be considered luxurious for members from poorer countries).
51.
See Simon Bradley, FIFA reforms face resistance-and huge support,
SwIssINFO (Dec. 5, 2012), https://www.swissinfo.chleng/football-scandals fifa-reformsface-resistance---and-huge-support/34067104 [https://perma.cc/2CCD-ACLL] (archived
Jan. 10, 2019) ("They see themselves more as a government than as a multinational
corporation."); cf. Matt Scott, Infantino has blown it, says Pieth, calling for state control
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(June
19,
2016),
http://www.insideworldfootball.com/2016/06/18/infantino-blown-says-pieth-callingstate-control-fifal [https://perma.cclPX6K-MDWY] (archived Jan. 10, 2019) ("They don't
want to be regulated anymore.").

52.
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53.
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Court? 2, (UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-38, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3050144
[https://perma.ccl9TLPKAFT] (archived Jan. 27, 2019); Roger Pielke Jr., How Can FIFA Be Held Accountable?,
16 SPORT MGMT. REV. 255, 260 (2013) [hereinafter Pielke Jr., Accountable] (citing the
suspension of Belize); see, e.g., Gerald Imray, Sudan banned by FIFA, CAF throws 3 clubs
out
of
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AP
NEws
(July
7,
2017),
https://apnews.com/ffd35dl9537a4d569747b8314e4ab8e4/Sudan-banned-by-FIFA,CAF-throws-3-clubs-out-of-competitions?utm-campaign=SocialFlow&utm-source=
Twitter&utmmedium=APSports [https://perma.cc/6868-T453] (archived Jan. 10, 2019)
(saying Sudan was suspended because the Ministry of Justice removed the SFA
president and the rest of the football association's board of directors).
54.
See, e.g., Nick Martin, Sepp Blatter blames media, U.S. for FIFA suspension,
WASH.
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(Feb.
19,
2016),
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55.

ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-

1877 at 294 (1988).

276

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:265

solved within our family." 56 Jeffrey Webb, who later became head of
CONCACAF after Jack Warner resigned, said much the same thing in
2002 in the face of corruption allegations facing Blatter, telling the
57
FIFA Congress that "FIFA is family and family must stay together."
Thus, relying upon outsiders, selected by the insiders and accountable
to the insiders, to parachute into the FIFA morass and save the day
seems to be a long shot. The FIFA Council's retention of the right to
appoint and fire independent heads of committees only underscores
that fact.
This does not mean that reform is a lost cause. One way to
increase accountability given the weaknesses of outsiders is to focus
more attention on the people who are already inside the organization.
Indeed, insiders were critical in uncovering the corruption that led to
the 2013 reforms and helped to lay the foundation for the U.S.
Department of Justice's arrests and indictments in 2015.58 Several
studies have suggested that this practice of "whistleblowing," or the
"disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal,
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers,
59
to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action," can be
more effective in combatting corporate fraud than conventional tools
such as securities regulators, independent auditors, private litigation,
60
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57.
deputy director of the Internal Audit Committee at FIFA)
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59.
Whistle-Blowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 4 (1985) [hereinafter Near & Miceli, Organizational
Dissidence]. The term "whistleblowing" reportedly derives "from the practice of English
policemen who blew their whistle when they observed the happening of some crime."
Siddhartha Dasgupta & Ankit Kesharwani, Whistleblowing: A Survey of Literature, 9
IUP J. CORP. Gov. 57, 57 (2010).
See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on CorporateFraud?,65 J.
60.
FIN. 2213, 2214 (2010); Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, Whistleblower Laws and
Exposed Corruption in the United States, 46 APPLIED ECON. 2331, 2339 (2014); Kelly
Richmond Pope & Chih-Chen Lee, Could the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 Be Helpful in Reforming Corporate America? An
Investigation on FinancialBounties and Whistle-Blowing Behaviors in the PrivateSector,
112 J. Bus. ETHICS 597, 605-06 (2013).
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Although these whistleblowing programs are not without their

critics, 62 they might have some distinct structural advantages in an

-

institution like FIFA. First, insiders are the most likely to have the
access to evidence of corporate fraud and misconduct. None of the
commonly cited alternative sources of accountability for international
sports organizations-such as governments, sponsors, or the media 63
have typically provided that accountability without insiders tipping
them off to the potential for wrongdoing. 64 This is especially true in
FIFA and its affiliated confederations and national member
associations, where transparency is difficult to come by even under the
latest reforms. Second, utilizing insiders in a nonprofit organization
helps to address the absence of residual claimants like stockholders to
monitor operations or to hold auditors accountable. Employee insiders
are often the actors with the most incentive to report fraud and abuse.
The problem is that FIFA has historically treated its
whistleblowers very badly.65 Indeed, even the whistleblowers who
came forward after the indictments to report on Infantino's own alleged
transgressions were reportedly fired for their disloyalty in providing
evidence to the Ethics Committee. 66 Transparency International, a
global- governance
nongovernmental organization,
proposed a
whistleblower program in the last round of reform discussions, but this

Yehonatan Givati, A Theory of Whistleblower Rewards, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 44 (2015);
Pope & Lee, supra note 60, at 597-98; Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui
Tam for Tax, 61 TAX L. 357, 361 (2008).
62.
See, e.g., Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten
Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 21-38 (2012) [hereinafter Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's
Whistleblower Provisions] (describing failures of Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms); Richard E.
Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 74-75 (2007) [hereinafter
Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations] (describing how many employees kept quiet rather
than reporting fraud); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt
to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisionsof the Dodd-FrankAct, 2012
BYU L. REV. 73, 91 (2012) (describing the limitations of the bounty scheme).
63.
See Pielke Jr., Accountable, supra note 53, at 260-63.
64.
See Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Wrongdoing, Whistle-Blowing, and
Retaliation in the U.S. Government, 28 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 263, 264 (2008)
[hereinafter Near & Miceli, Wrongdoing] ("Modern organizations are so complex that
outsiders are unlikely to become aware of organizational action without learning inside
information from current or former employees.").

65.
See, e.g., MERSIADES, supra note 2, at 317-28; see also Owen Gibson, World
Cup whistleblowers submit complaints after cover is blown, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 17,
2014, 8:25 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/nov/17/whistleblowerscomplain-fifa-ethics-report [https://perma.cc/ZJM3-P4VL] (archived Jan. 20, 2019)
[hereinafter Gibson, Complaints]; James Masters, World Cup: Who would be a FIFA
whistle-blower?, CNN (Nov. 18, 2014, 1:43 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/18/sport/
football-uefa-fifa-whistle-blower-qatar/ [https://perma.cc/8YJK-GULX] (archived Jan.
20, 2019).
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67
was ignored and it was not considered in the latest set of reforms.
This reduces the chance that future whistleblowers will be willing to
come forward. If reformers are going to have a chance at changing the
culture of corruption at FIFA, they must be able to harness the power
of insiders at both the FIFA level and the confederation and national
member association levels.
The Article begins by describing FIFA and its long history of
corruption. In Part II, it then discusses the reform efforts undertaken
in recent years, including the latest round adopted in early 2016, and
the recent revelations that suggest that the threat of abuse remains.
In Part III, the Article discusses the structural impediments to reform,
noting that most of the reforms are borrowed from the public
corporation arena where, at least in theory, stockholders and the
market offer a measure of accountability. By contrast, FIFA is a
nonprofit that lacks the kind of proxies for investor accountability that
exist in the United States. The Article proceeds in Part IV to address
an alternative means of providing accountability, arguing that while
no one method is sufficient, adopting a program of whistleblower
inducements and protections to harness the power of insiders should
be a critical ingredient of any effort. In the conclusion, the Article
discusses why this is a particularly appropriate time for FIFA to adopt
a comprehensive whistleblower program given the threats to
whistleblowers in both Russia, where the 2018 World Cup was held,
and Qatar, where the 2022 World Cup is slated to be held.

II. FIFA AND ITS CORRUPTION

FIFA was founded in 1904 by seven nations in Europe as an
umbrella organization that sought to standardize the rules for the
68
game and to stage an international tournament. They had originally
intended to ally with the British associations of England, Scotland,
Wales, and Ireland, which had convened to form their Football
Association (FA) over forty years earlier in 1863,69 but the FA resisted
attempts to engage with their continental counterparts on a grander
scale at that time. 70 FIFA nevertheless continued on without them,

67.

See Pielke Jr., An Evaluationof the FIFA Governance Reform Process, supra

note 9, at 210; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, SAFE HANDS: BUILDING INTEGRITY AND

TRANSPARENCY AT FIFA 6 (2011).
TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 12; Christine Eisenberg, FIFA 1975-2000: The
68.
Business of a Football Development Organisation,31 HIST. Soc. RES. 55, 56 (2006). The
founding nations were Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the club Espir FC Madrid, representing Spain. CONN, supra note 39,
at 23.
69.
See TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 31; History of FIFA-Foundation, FIFA,
17, 2019)
(last visited Jan.
http://www.fifa.comlabout-fifa/who-we-are/history/
[https://perma.cclKL72-XSQ] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
CONN, supra note 39, at 25; TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 12-13; see
70.
BENSINGER, supranote 2, at 46 ("England's Football Association, already forty years old,
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albeit while still adopting the FA's Laws of the Game as their standard
for games played by their members.71 Eventually, after several starts
and stops, the two groups permanently united in 1946,72 operating
primarily to regulate the game, create rules for the movement of
players internationally, and organize the World Cup that had been
held every four years since 1930.73

It was not until 1974 with the rise to power of Brazilian Jodo
Havelange that FIFA began to enter the modern era as a major
international sports power. 74 As Alan Tomlinson described, "[w]hen
Havelange took over at FIFA, it was a modest operation with few
personnel and negligible finances, fewer than a hundred member
national associations, and a single tournament, in the form of the 16nation World Cup finals."75 The transformation under his leadership
was nothing less than astounding. "A quarter of a century later, when
Havelange stepped down in Paris in 1998 on the eve of the first ever
32-nation senior competition," FIFA's revenues from the World Cup
were more than $4 billion and football as a whole was estimated to
generate approximately $250 billion annually. 76 Havelange also ran
FIFA like a for-profit enterprise to generate its revenues, leading
critics to accuse him of "misus[ing] the organization as a license to print
money."7 7
Part of the problem with FIFA's rise to global prominence was that
the growth in revenues was not accompanied by a change in the
organization itself. Guido Tognoni, FIFA's former secretary-general
and media director, noted that "people say that [Havelange] was
leading FIFA like an industry-but he was leading FIFA like a private
enterprise, like a proprietor," which Tognoni agreed, was as if
Havelange "owned" FIFA.7 8 If Havelange "laid the groundwork for epic
and endemic corruption," 7 9 his successor, Sepp Blatter, nurtured it and
allowed it to flourish by further expanding the patronage system
Havelange put in place to curry favor with voters outside of the
traditional European nations.80 The result was a system ripe for the

was particularly skeptical, writing dourly that it 'cannot see the advantages of such a
federation"').
71.
See CONN, supra note 39, at 46.
72.
Id. at 32.
73.
TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 19-21.
74.
See id. at 63-64.
75.
Id. at 63.
76.
Id. at 64. According to David Conn, though, it would be too much to credit
Havelange for this growth in revenues. See CONN, supra note 39, at 53 ("There was to be
a sudden multiplication of income for Fifa, but this was not a result of Joao Havelange's
business brilliance, rather a consequence of the TV rights hyper-inflation which Fifa
reaped principally after the France World Cup in 1998.").
77.
Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 60.
78.
TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 66.
79.
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80.
See TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 71; Guillermo Jorge, Fixing FIFA: The
Experience of the Independent Governance Committee, 21 Sw. J. INT'L L. 165, 170 (2014).
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corruption that eventually was exposed in May of 2015 in the arrests
of officials in the Bar-au-Lac hotel in Zurich, Switzerland.s"
According to the U.S. Department of Justice's indictments brought
against current and former officials of FIFA and its regional
confederations in the Western Hemisphere-CONCACAF and
CONMEBOL-the conspiracy to use these organizations to engage in
criminal activities such as fraud, bribery, and money laundering
82
extends as far back as twenty-five years. Although the roots of the
83
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billion.85
Documenting all of the allegations of corruption is not necessary
to reveal the depths to which FIFA and its affiliated regional
organizations have sunk. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the
boldness of the misconduct. Many of the most colorful illustrations
begin with Jack Warner of Trinidad and Tobago, who was vice
president of FIFA and president of CONCACAF and the Caribbean
Football Union (CFU). 86 He may have been a target for bribery
attempts in part because, as one commentator put it, he came from a
87
country where "corruption is a part of life," but even more relevant is
that he held positions of importance both at FIFA and in his region.
First, he was a member of the FIFA Executive Committee and
88
therefore had a vote on where to host a World Cup. Second, he

81.
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historic epoch of corruption."). Moreover, the raid at the Bar au Lac hotel was not even
the first corruption case brought to trial against FIFA. That occurred ten years earlier
in a bribery investigation involving FIFA's commercial partner, International Sport and
Leisure ("ISL"). Although there was evidence of at least $22 million of bribery and
kickbacks paid to Havelange and his son-in-law, Brazilian FA president Ricardo
Teixeira, as well as CONMEBOL president Nicolas Leoz, most of the defendants were
acquitted and no one served any prison time in the scandal. BENSINGER, supra note 2, at
32-33.
Indictment 5/20/15, supra note 82, at 31.
84.
Panja, A League of His Own, supra note 50.
85.
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[https://perma.cc/XCV5-9M4B] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
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[https://perma.cc/SZ5Q-NTXJI (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
Prior to 2011, the decision where to host the World Cup was exclusively made
88.
by the Executive Committee, which facilitated vote buying. Reforms adopted at that time

2019]

REFORMING FIFA

281

controlled a large bloc of votes from the Caribbean member nations and
many of the smaller members of CONCACAF itself.89 Because FIFA's
Congress operates on a one-nation, one-vote principle,9 0 this meant
that he could claim to be able to deliver a large number of votes on
issues presented for decision at the FIFA Congress, which most notably
included the election of the FIFA president.
Warner reportedly received bribes or siphoned off money on a
number of occasions during his tenure either in return for (1)
supporting a particular country's bid to host the World Cup or (2)
delivering the vote for a particular candidate for president. Evidence
of bribery in the context of an election came in 2011. At the time,
Mohammed bin Hammam, the Qatari businessman running against
Sepp Blatter for president of FIFA, reportedly provided Warner with
the funds to distribute $40,000 in cash to each of the CFU's twenty-five
members, which he did in brown envelopes at a meeting of the
organization. 9 ' When some individuals questioned this at the meeting,
Warner protested that it wasn't a bribe, but rather a "gift" from a
candidate who had "fresh ideas," and the CFU could deliver him the
presidency if it voted as a bloc. 92 Warner informed the crowd that "any
country that doesn't want the gift has the right to give it back to him."9 3
According to reports, Warner added that "I know there are people here
who believe they are more pious than thou. If you are pious, go to a
church, friends, but the fact is that our business is our business." 94
An example of bribery in the context of a World Cup vote occurred
in 2010 when South Africa was named host for the 2010 games. In
order to secure the vote of Warner's bloc of nations, South Africa
promised to pay amounts totaling $10 million for a "so-called diaspora
legacy programme to develop football in the Caribbean."9 5 Instead of
going toward the development of the game in that region, though, the
funds went into Warner's pocket and the pocket of Chuck Blazer of the

require such votes to be submitted to the FIFA Congress for a vote of all member nations.
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27,
2015),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-fifas-structure-lends-itself-tocorruption/ [https://perma.cc/6SNN-PSVP] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
89.
Given all of the small island nations in CONCACAF, the Caribbean has more
votes than all of South America. PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 46.
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/28/the-rise-and-fall-oftrinidad-jack-warner-the-former-schoolteacher-at-the-center-of-the-fifa-scandal/
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BBC NEWS (June 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-33039014
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United States, 96 Warner's second-in-command at CONCACAF and a
fellow FIFA Executive Committee member-who later became an
97
informant after being confronted by the FBI. A similar thing occurred
during the bidding over the 2022 World Cup, with Warner and his sons
reportedly receiving $1.2 million from a company linked to the Qatari
bid.98 The transfer was so suspect that a bank in the Cayman Islands
refused to process the payments and it eventually went through a bank
in New York, which is one of the ways that the illegal payment both
99
came to the attention of the FBI and came within US jurisdiction.
Many times, bribes appeared to be granted merely to solidify
Blatter's support in the region. For example, FIFA sold the Caribbean
broadcast rights to the 2010 and 2014 World Cups to the CFU for a
mere $600,000.100 Warner then sublicensed the rights to a Cayman
Islands company that he owned, J&D International, and for which
Jeffrey Webb, who eventually succeeded Warner as president of
CONCACAF and was also indicted by the United States, served on the
board of directors.1 0 1 The company then sold the rights to a Jamaican
TV station for approximately $20 million, resulting in a tidy profit for
Warner and his company.1 02 Perhaps even more outrageously, Warner
reportedly diverted money intended for Haitian earthquake relief
efforts in 2010 to his own personal use, including $500,000 sent from
10 3
South Korean football officials.
Warner, who resigned from FIFA in 2011 and was subsequently
banned for life for ethics violations,1 04 may have been one of the most

Owen Gibson, Sepp Blatter under pressure over World Cup TV rights links to
96.
Jack Warner, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/20
15/sep/13/jack-warner-sepp-blatter-world-cup-rights-profit [https://perma.cc/JX8S752Z]
(archived Jan. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Gibson, Blatter under pressure];Teri Thompson et
al., Soccer Rat! The inside story of how Chuck Blazer, ex-U.S. soccer executive and FIFA
bigwig, became a confidential informant for the FBI, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 1, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.comlsports/soccer/soccer-rat-ex-u-s-soccer-exec-chuck-blazer-

-
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22
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investigation-former-Fifa-vice-president-Jack-Warner-and-family-paid-millions.html
[https://perma.cclL82X-NY4Q] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
See id.
99.
100. Gibson, Blatter under pressure, supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. See id. This was a long-standing practice. In 2001, FIFA's then-secretarygeneral, Michael Zen-Ruffinen, claimed that Blatter underpriced FIFA media deals for
regional soccer leaders by as much as $500 million "to solidify his support so that he
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audacious of the participants in corruption, but the pervasiveness of
the activity runs deep throughout the organization of FIFA and its
regional confederations. In the two indictments handed down in the
United States, forty-one people or entities were charged with engaging
in schemes to solicit and receive more than $200 million in bribes and
kickbacks. 0 5 Moreover, although the charges have focused on
individuals in the Western Hemisphere because that is where US
investigators' jurisdiction and access has been strongest, it is highly
likely that corruption extends to other regions and confederations. In
2010, for example, Reynald Temarii, the president of the Oceanic
Football Confederation, reportedly received multiple offers of between
$10 and $12 million to sway his vote and the backing of his
confederation for the 2018 World Cup hosting decision, and Temarii
was subsequently suspended by FIFA.10 The same year, Amos
Adamu, a Nigerian member of the FIFA Executive Committee,
reportedly solicited $800,000 for the construction of fields in return for
"facilitating access" to the men who would decide where the World Cup
would be hosted, and he too was banned by FIFA. 0 7 In November 2015,
Ganesh Thapa, the head of the All-Nepal Football Association, and
Viphet Sihachakr, president of the Lao Football Federation, were both
banned from FIFA for accepting bribes.10 8 Even in Europe, where laws
and customs against corruption ostensibly appear to be tighter than in
some regions, FIFA commenced an investigation into allegations that
Germany won the hosting rights to the 2006 World Cup with the use
of a multi-million dollar slush fund set up to buy votes. 0 9 The Swiss
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2015).
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2015),
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THE
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(Mar.
22,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/mar/22/fifa-franz-beckenbauer-germany2006-world-cup [https://perma.ccK37U-AWTQ] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); see Rob
Turner, Report: More dubious payments uncovered in German World Cup scandal, DW
(Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/report-more-dubious-payments-uncovered-ingerman-world-cup-scandalla-38115278 [https://perma.cclXRM2-D4RC] (archived Jan.
20, 2019). Wolfgang Niersbach, former chair of the German Football Association, the
chairman of the local organizing committee for the 2006 German World Cup Organizing
Committee and a member of the FIFA Council and UEFA Executive Committee, was
already suspended for one year by the FIFA Ethics Committee for failing to report
evidence of misconduct. Independent Ethics Committee bans Wolfgang Niersbach, FIFA
(July 25, 2016), http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2016/m=7/news=independent-
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have also opened up their own criminal investigation relating to the
same allegations.1 1 0
Not only is FIFA corruption widespread, it also appears to go
straight to the top. As mentioned earlier, two of the most powerful men
in football-FIFA president Sepp Blatter and UEFA president Michel
Platini-were suspended for conflicts of interest and breaches of
loyalty.' Blatter allegedly authorized FIFA to make a payment of $2
million to Platini in 2011.112 The men claimed that it was to
compensate Platini for a verbal agreement they had made a decade
earlier for Platini to serve as an advisor to Blatter during the period
from 1999-2002.113 The Ethics Committee, however, found the
explanation unconvincing and the timing of it suggested that it may
have been designed to purchase Platini and UEFA's loyalty to Blatter
114
Both Blatter and Platini
in his election contest with Bin Hammam.
those suspensions
on
appeal
although
years,
were suspended for eight
1 15
investigation by
under
remain
also
They
were reduced to six years.
116
violations.
criminal
Swiss authorities for possible
This isn't to say that the perpetrators of bribery and corruption
have necessarily been an unmitigated evil for FIFA or world football.
Many of the worst offenders only were able to secure their ill-gotten
gains by significantly expanding football's revenues. In theory, this
should have trickled down to the benefit of the people in their regions.
In CONCACAF, for example, the annual budget was a mere $140,000
before Warner and Blazer took over and it became "a $40 million cash
cow on sponsorship, media, and vendor contracts that Blazer
negotiated."' 1 7 Nevertheless, it's not clear how much, if any, of the
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VYPU] (Jan. 20, 2019). German prosecutors have also charged former German Football
Association and FIFA officials with tax evasion in connection with misreporting a
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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-germany2018),
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111. See supra text accompanying note 6.
112. FIFA ethics court bans Sepp Blatter and Michel Platinifor 8 years, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-fifa-blatter-platini-banned20151221-story.html [https://perma.cc/6ZJC-TBB5] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
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money actually made its way to the people who play and watch the
game.1 18 For example, Trinidad's Centre of Excellence (the Centre), a
football academy built with CONCACAF funds, reportedly hosts "more
weddings and conventions than matches."1 19 Clive Toye, a former
senior consultant at CONCACAF, remarked that "I never saw a single
person playing a game or practicing" at the Centre's one field.1 20 Since
the Centre is registered personally to Warner, none of its profits are
plowed back into the sport either. 121 Much like in FIFA more generally,
while the game grew in popularity and spread to new places, most of
the revenue from that explosion in interest redounded to the benefit of
the leaders rather than the game itself.

III. FIFA REFORM
None of the recent revelations regarding FIFA corruption should
have been much of a surprise to even casual fans of the game.
Reformers have been attempting to fix FIFA for years. Since the 2010
World Cup alone, there have been two major reform efforts
commissioned by FIFA's leadership. Both of these produced a number
of thoughtful recommendations, many of which were adopted in whole
or in part by the FIFA Executive Committee and Congress and were
implemented or are in the process of being implemented. Nevertheless,
the early signs suggest that although the reforms may have improved
matters to some extent, those reforms that appear to have been
beneficial are already being subverted and those that might have made
the most difference remain blocked. As a result, it is hard to be
optimistic that real change has occurred.
A. 2011-2013
The first of the recent movements for reform of FIFA came after
allegations of corruption and bribery surrounding Mohammed bin
Hammam's failed campaign for president in 2011. FIFA created an
Independent Governance Commission to craft an institutional reform

118. The Caribbean Football Union's financial situation, for example, has been
described as "grave," suggesting that any profits Warner secured for it have long since
been siphoned away. Steve Menary, Caribbean football in 'dire financial straits' as
election looms, WORLDSOCCER (July 19, 2016), http://www.worldsoccer.com/news/
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[https://perma.cc/SG94-CBXG] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
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proposal. 2 2 They were hampered from the beginning by allegations
that the commission, chaired by Mark Pieth, a criminal law professor
at the Basel Institute of Governance in Switzerland, was not actually
"independent."1 2 3 Observers complained that Pieth was appointed
personally by Blatter and his status as a paid advisor on a report
submitted prior to being named chair of the commission tainted his
24
ability to be neutral in his recommendations.1 After the commission
had concluded its investigation and reported its recommendations,
Guido Tognoni explained that 'Mark Pieth has good intentions but to
me he's like Sepp Blatter's poodle. He must bark loud but he's not
allowed to bite."1 25
Ultimately, the commission made nineteen recommendations,
only six of which were fully implemented at the time and five more of
26
which were partially implemented.1 One member of the commission
suggested that the most important recommendation, and one of the few
fully adopted by FIFA, was the radical reform of its Ethics Committee,
with its creation of investigatory and adjudicatory chambers and
27
The concept of an Ethics
adoption of a new Code of Ethics.1
Committee, which had first been formed in 2004,128 was cited by
Blatter in 2013 as one of his six crowning achievements since assuming
the presidency in 1998,129 but it had floundered for a lack of
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would be
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with
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by
"capture"
their
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30
recommended
also
The commission
FIFA's "patronage network."'
that the Ethics Committee's investigatory chamber be permitted to
independently initiate investigations, thereby insulating it from the
3
politics of the FIFA Executive Committee.' ' Michael Garcia, the
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126. Id. at 203.
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former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, was
appointed as chair of the investigatory chamber in 2012, promising a
new era of independence and accountability in FIFA. 132
Notwithstanding Blatter's declaration upon the completion of the
commission's term in 2013 that "we have weathered the storm,"13 3 it
was obvious that very little had changed. Most of the commissioners'
recommendations were either rejected or partially ignored by FIFA's
Executive Committee.1 3 4 One member of the commission, anti-bribery
specialist Alexandra Wrage, quit in protest over the failure to
implement the reform recommendations. 13 5 Tognoni concluded that
although Pieth had a "promising approach," he was "banging his head
against a block of granite." 13 6 The reforms adopted were described as
"nothing more than .. . marginal."1 3 7
Furthermore, even the reforms that were implemented soon fell
apart. After Garcia's appointment as independent ethics investigator
in 2012, he undertook an investigation of FIFA corruption in the wake
of allegations about the selection process for the 2022 World Cup in
Qatar.13 8 In the fall of 2014, Garcia submitted a 430-page report to
Hans-Joachim Eckert, the chair of the adjudicatory chamber of the
Ethics Committee.1 39 Critics were dubious of the investigation, with
The Economist claiming that "Garcia, who spent more than a year
looking into the allegations [of vote-rigging and kickbacks], never
interviewed Mr. bin Hammam or examined the trove of e-mails
acquired by the Sunday Times."1 40 Even so, Eckert refused to submit
the entire report to the committee, choosing instpad to provide his own
forty-two-page written summary.1 41 This prompted Garcia to resign,
calling Eckert's summary "incomplete and erroneous" in material
respects and suggesting that his ability to operate independently had
been seriously compromised. 142
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B. 2015-2016
The second major reform movement in the last decade occurred in
the months following the arrests and subsequent indictments of
numerous FIFA, CONCACAF, and CONMEBOL officials in May of
2015. Reform was already in progress as a result of the Garcia report
submitted in the fall of 2015, but the indictments and the ensuing
resignation of FIFA president Sepp Blatter gave the movement
renewed energy. 143 The focus was on increasing the number of
outsiders and trying to create spaces for political independence.
Although it is still early, the results do not suggest that the effort has
had much success.
As with the reform effort that preceded it a few years earlier, the
process started with the creation of an ad hoc body in July of 2015.144
Almost immediately after its creation, this Reform Task Force was
immersed in controversy. With the Audit and Compliance Chair,
145
Transparency
Dominic Scala, slotted to lead the task force,
- be fully
not
"would
committee
International noted that the
independent . . . [and] will not be sufficient to win back trust in

FIFA."1 46 Coca-Cola, one of FIFA's main sponsors, dismissed the effort,
calling instead for a fully independent committee led by an "eminent"
chair who could review the governance of the organization from top to
bottom.1 4 7
FIFA responded to the critics by subsequently dumping Scala as
chair of the Reform Task Force and instead appointing the
International Olympic Committee's (IOC) former director-general,
Swiss lawyer Francois Carrard, to lead the task force in its effort to
make recommendations about how to address the organization's
48
This was
apparently "widespread corruption within its leadership."1
and
corruption
with
an ironic twist given the IOC's own problems

143. Indeed, Blatter promised in his resignation speech after the indictments that
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2
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scandal while Carrard was there.1 49 Carrard did not help matters by
later dismissing soccer in America as "just an ethnic sport for girls in
schools," which suggested an underlying disdain for the country that
was leading the prosecution of abuses he was supposedly trying to
50
correct.o
Moreover, even if Carrard could be considered an impartial
outsider with no previous ties to FIFA or the game of football,1 5
observers doubted that the task force would have much effect. Michael
Hershman, an international corporate governance consultant and a
member of the Independent Governance Commission, reportedly had
"no faith" that the committee would be able to accomplish its tasks:
"The only way things will change is if there's a top-to-bottom, complete
reorganization of FIFA, with a change in leadership and in the top
staff."1 52
Notwithstanding the dismal predictions, pressure from both
sponsors and another round of US indictments in December led to the
acceptance of all of the recommendations of the Reform Task Force in
a special meeting of the FIFA Congress in February of 2016.153 There
were four major categories of reforms: (1) restructuring committees
and governance authority; (2) checks on members and limits on terms;
(3) increasing transparency and outside auditing; and (4) requiring
more outsiders and increased independence.1 54 Unlike the previous
reforms, these were all implemented, but they still have been described
as "modest" and not going far enough.' 5 5
The first category of reform was to restructure committees and
governance authorities in an attempt to provide a "clear separation

149. See Amy Shipley, IOC Expels Six for Corruption,WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 1999),
https://www.washingtonpost.comlarchive/politics/1999/03/18/ioc-expels-six-forcorruption/83106a9b-5347-4fb7-aec9-ef71aa6O7bdal?noredirect=on&utm term=
.7750aea53043 [https://perma.cc/X8YM-3S42] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
150. Christian Red et al., FIFA reform committee leader apologizes for making
disparaging remarks about American soccer, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/soccer/fifa-reform-leader-apologizes-ripping-soccerarticle- 1.2422795 [https://perma.cc/698S-9EYR] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
151. Carrard himself expressed doubt that outside influence was necessary to
reform FIFA, opining that "[bleing some kind of an insider I believe is a necessity."
PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 209.

152.
153.

Id. at 208.
PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supranote 11, at 217-18; Andrew Warshaw, FIFA

sponsors turn up reform pressure as exco gathers for Carrardreport, INSIDE WORLD

FOOTBALL (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.insideworldfootball.com/2015/12/02/fifa-sponsorsturn-up-reform-pressure-as-exco-gathers-for-carrad-report/

[https://perma.cc/KB6E-

3F7Z] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); Fifa sponsors demand 'independent oversight'of reform
process, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/
dec/0 1/fifa-sponsors-reform-process-letter [https://perma.cc/94ZY-HYXQ] (archived Jan.
20, 2019).
154. See generally FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE, 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE
REPORT (2015), https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/football
governance/02/74/17/54/2015.11.27finalreport forpublication neutral.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Z8Y-FXAS] (archived Jan. 20, 2019) [hereinafter 2016 FIFA REFORM
COMMITTEE REPORT].
155. MERSIADES, supra note 2, at 341.
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56
between 'political' and management functions of FIFA."e The FIFA
Executive Committee previously had the power not only to supervise
and provide strategic direction to FIFA, but also to control key
157
This
management decisions that implemented those strategies.
more
with
members
Committee
Executive
the
presented
theoretically
opportunities to extract bribes or to curry favor, such as in the decision
as to how to distribute funds under the Goal Programme for developing
soccer in needy areas.' 5 8 Thus, FIFA separated those functions. Under
the new rules, the political and supervisory functions would be
exercised by a FIFA Council, while the management and executive
powers would be exercised by the FIFA Administration, led by the
FIFA secretary-general.1 5 9
This separation of functions is consistent with a more Germanstyle two-tier corporate board. Under this structure, a-corporation has
a supervisory board and a management board, which in theory reduces
opportunities for conflicts of interest and self-dealing.16 0 In reality,
however, the evidence is scant that it has had much of an effect, and
some scandals in Germany and elsewhere have been traced to defects
in the system.161 Moreover, if the president and the FIFA Council
exercise their supervisory power to replace the secretary-general as a
way to ensure that management decisions are made to their liking, as
may have occurred with the move to permit the council to replace
members of independent committees, then the separation will be
merely in form rather than substance.
In the second category of reforms, FIFA enacted measures to
guard against appointing and retaining corrupt leaders. On the former,
FIFA mandated integrity checks conducted by an independent FIFA
Review committee, which were already utilized in the election to

156.

Id. at 5.

157.

See FIFA, STATUTORY REFORMS FAQ-EXTRAORDINARY FIFA CONGRESS 1-2

https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/faq-statutory-reforms2016),
27,
(Jan.
extraordinary-ffa-congress-2747654.pdf?cloudid=rv7iv1mcltllzh5zbl8u
[https://perma.cc/SG95-R2RP] (archived Jan. 20, 2019) (explaining distinction between
the jurisdiction of the former FIFA Executive Committee and the proposed FIFA
Council).
158. Cf. Emmanuel Bayle, "FIFA-gate":-AnOpportunity to Clean Up International
Sports Governance, SOCCER & SOC'Y 1, 2 (2015) (suggesting GOAL fund distribution
should be entrusted to an independent organization such as a foundation).
159. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 154, at 5.
160.

BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION

623 (1997).
161. Id. at 619. See generally, e.g., Benedicte Millet-Reyes & Richard Zhao, A
ComparisonBetween One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Structures in France, 21 J. INT'L FIN.
MGMT. & ACCT, 279 (2010) (finding that French blockholders often misused the two-tier
structure); Dieter Fockenbrock, The Flaws of Germany's Corporate Board System,
HANDELSBLATT TODAY (May 28, 2018), https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/companies/
of-laymen-and-lemmings-the-flaws-of-germanys-corporate-board(archived Mar. 13, 2019)
system/23582266.html [https://perma.cc/YLM8-EUHPI
(describing scandals at a number of German companies).
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replace Blatter.16 2 Integrity checks are a standard process in the
business world and they were recommended by the Independent
Governance Commission in 2012, but they were nonetheless resisted
in the past.' 6 3 To further ensure that FIFA Council members would not
become entrenched and thereby tempted to corruption, FIFA also
enacted term limits.1 64 The FIFA president and each FIFA council

member (other than ex officio members) would be limited to three
terms of four years each (whether consecutive or not), for a maximum
of twelve years.1 6 5 Although not draconian, these kinds of term limits
had been hotly contested during the reform process and, indeed, had
been rejected in past reform movements,1 66 so this was hailed as a
significant step.
A third category of reform was to increase transparency and
outside auditing. Most controversially, this included publication of
compensation figures for top executives.1 67 Blatter had always resisted
calls to make public his compensation, protesting that it "risked
embarrassing and upsetting his allies on the FIFA board whose pay is
also secret." 16 8 In the 2016 reform, however, the FIFA Congress
approved the annual disclosure of the individual compensation of the
president, all FIFA council members, the secretary-general, and
chairpersons of all the independent standing and judicial committees
such as Ethics and Audit and Compliance.1 69 Soon after, FIFA revealed

162. See 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 154, at 7-8 (noting
implementation of this reform began even before the Task Force Reform Report was
released); Martyn Ziegler, FIFA ethics committee to carry out 'integrity checks' on
presidential
candidates,
DAILY
MAIH
(Sept.
10,
2015),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-3229512/FIFA-ethics-committeecarry-integrity-checks-presidential-candidates.html
[https://perma.cc/4NBR-GT6M]
(archived Jan. 27, 2019) (describing the intent of the Ethics Committee to use integrity
checks for the presidential election).
163. Pielke Jr., An Evaluationof the FIFA Governance Reform Process, supra note
9, at 218; see FIFA congress to debate age limits, ESPN (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.espn.com/espn/wire?id=9224088 [https://perma.cclXTC4-XVUK] (archived
Jan. 20, 2019) ("The advisory panel, chaired by Swiss law professor Mark Pieth, has
repeatedly been rebuffed by FIFA in requests for . .. authorization for an independent
group to perform integrity checks on senior soccer officials.").
164. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 154, at 7.
165. Id.
166. Tariq Panja, Soccer Officials Reject Term Limits for FIFA Executive,
BLOOMBERG (June 11,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-061 1/soccer-officials-reject-term-limits-for-fifa-executive
[https://perma.cc/R6JK-NDXK]
(archived Jan. 20, 2019); Pielke Jr., An Evaluation of the FIEA Governance Reform
Process, supra note 9, at 216; see Bayle, supra note 158, at 2 (proposing two eight-year
terms as the maximum).
167. See generally 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 154.
168. John Leicester, Last big test for Sepp Blatter is whether he can lift lid on the
secret of how much he is paid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 10, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/worldlarticles/2015/07/10/1ifting-the-lid-on-one-of-fifasbig-secrets-executive-pay [https://perma.cc/TRC3-ZTCQ] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
169. See 2016 REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 154, at 17-19.
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that Blatter had been paid £2.6 million in 2015,170 although given the
revelations of under-the-table payments in the DOJ indictments, it's
hard to know how seriously to trust such figures even if verified by
audited financial statements. In fact, internal investigations
subsequently revealed that the disclosed salary figures failed to
include almost 80 million Swiss francs that Blatter and other top
17
officials paid themselves as bonuses and other incentive payments.

III. THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

While testifying before the U.S. Senate Commerce Subcommittee
on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, Insurance and Data Security
in hearings held over the FIFA corruption scandal, Michael Hershman
noted that FIFA, with income in the billions of dollars, "should be
172
Given the reforms FIFA
treated like what it is: a major corporation."
to
mean that FIFA should
appears
statement
Hershman's
adopted,
has
measures to which
governance
corporate
of
kind
same
the
to
be subject
prominent of
most
the
of
One
subject.
are
corporations
public
major
reformers
FIFA
that
measures
governance
corporate
US-style
those
have sought to mimic is the use of outside or independent directors.
The problem is that, even in the US public-corporation context, it is not
clear that the move to require independent directors has been
successful in reducing fraud and corruption. For FIFA, the obstacles
are actually greater.
A. IndependentDirectors in the United States
The prominence of independent directors is a relatively new
development in American corporations. During the 1930s, about half
of all directors of a typical board of directors of a public corporation
were insiders, and many of the rest were at least affiliated with the
company, occupying positions such as chief outside counsel at the
74
company's law firm. 7 3 This remained true in the 1950s.1 One study

170. David Conn, Fifa reveals former president Sepp Blatter's salary was 92.6m,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/mar/17/
sepp-blatter-fifa-president-annual-salary [https://perma.cc/4GLG-V73C] (archived Jan.
20, 2019).
171. Joshua Robinson & Matthew Futterman, Top FIFA Officials Allegedly Paid
Each Other $80 Million, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/threetop-fifa-officials-shared-80-million-in-five-years-investigators-say- 1464959109
[https://perma.cc/KQ3M-KVHP] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
172. PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 189 (quoting Michael Hirshman).
173. See Steven A. Bank et al., Executive Pay: What Worked?, 42 J. CORP. L. 59,
81-82 (2016); see also ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE

CORPORATION 122 (1945) (with twenty-five selected large industrial corporations, 191 of
the 372 directors were officers).
174. See Gordon Rise, supranote 20, at 1468 ("Circa 1950 [it was] ... a normative
and positive matter . . . that boards should consist of the firm's senior officers . . . .");
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of the rise of independent directors over time concluded that in the
1950s it was still commonly understood "that boards should consist of
the firm's senior officers, some outsiders with deep connections with
the firm ... and a few directors who were nominally independent but
handpicked by the CEO."17 5
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the tide turned for
independent directors. Through a combination of court decisions,
shareholder activism, and regulatory activity, a growing number of
corporations started appointing directors who were more than just
nominally independent. By the middle of the 1970s, the percentage of
inside or affiliated directors in large public corporations began to fall
precipitously and the percentage of independent directors rose
steadily.1 76 In 2005, only 15 percent of directors in large public
companies were executives of the same firm and only an additional 11
percent were considered affiliated.1 77 A full 74 percent of the directors
were considered independent. 7 8 Moreover, according to a Conference
Board survey in 2006, 30 percent of the companies were led by an
outsider serving as chairman of the board, while an additional 48
percent had an independent director in a leadership position.' 79
After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the use of
independent directors increased even further. Although the act did not
require independent directors, it enacted standards for audit
committees and for exchanges that spurred reforms.18 0 As a result of
the act, all three major exchanges-the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ-adopted rules requiring
that a majority of the members of a firm's board of directors be
independent.'18 By 2013, 85 percent of directors in US public
corporations were independent, and in 60 percent of public
corporations the only nonindependent director on the board was the
chief executive officer.1 82

Kenneth M. Lehn, Sukesh Patro & Mengxin Zhao, Determinants of the Size and
Composition of US CorporateBoards: 1935-2000, 38 FIN. MGMT. 747, 758 (2009).
175. Gordon Rise, supra note 20, at 1468; see Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. L.
921, 924, 933 (1999) ("In the 1960s most [large U.S. corporations] had a majority of inside
directors").
176. Gordon Rise, supra note 20, at 1565; see Baum, supra note 19, at 2 ("[T]he
concept of independent directors and the related model of a 'monitoring board of
directors' originated in the US in the 1970s and underwent some modifications
thereafter.").
177. Gordon Rise, supra note 20, at 1565.
178. Id.
179.

BAINBRIDGE CORPORATION, supra note 19, at 188.

180. Id. at 177.
181. Id. The New York Stock Exchange had previously adopted a requirement that
all listed companies have independent directors on the audit committee. Donald C.
Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 87 (2007).
182. Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 855, 857 (2014); Baum, supranote 19, at 2.
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In theory, this move to independent directors reduces the threat
of managerial expropriation and thereby improves the performance of
a firm,' 8 3 but the data in support of that proposition is mixed. While
some studies have found that the presence of independent directors
184
others find no
improves performance and reduces the risk of fraud,
185
As Harald
such connection or even find a negative relationship.
Baum observed, "in spite of (i) much faith and fortune in the West, and
more recently in Asia, being placed on board independence and (ii) the
corresponding enthusiasm of policy makers to promote or enforce it,
the empirical support for staffing boards with independent directors
186
remains surprisingly shaky."
One problem with independent directors is that although they
may start out independent,1 8 7 they can quickly be co-opted. This can
occur via the social norms that inhibit criticism generally, which are
only increased when outside directors are required to interact more
with executives in order to acquire the information necessary to make
88
As Leo Strine, current Delaware Supreme Court Justice
decisions.s
and former Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery,

183. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separationof Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 315 (1983).
184. See Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the
Board of Director Composition and FinancialStatement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 463
(1996) (finding that financial fraud is lower in firms with a higher percentage of outside
directors); Christopher Chen et al., Board Independence as Panaceato Tunneling? An
Empirical Study of Related Party Transactions in Hong Kong and Singapore, 15 J.
EmPiRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 987, 1018 (2018) (finding higher board independence correlated
with lower incidence of tunneling in Hong Kong and Singapore between 2009 and 2015);
Gongmeng Chen, et al., Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Fraud:
Evidence from China, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 424, 446 (2006) (finding, in a study of Chinese
corporations, that outside directors help deter fraud); Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta,
Who's Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside DirectorsProtect Shareholders'Interests?,40
FIN. REV. 155, 171 (2005) (finding that boards with a higher percentage of inside
directors are more likely to face shareholder litigation).
185. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 175; Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Non-CorrelationBetween Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J.
CORP. L. 231, 263 (2002); see also Shams Pathan & Robert Faff, Does Board Structure in
Banks Really Affect Their Performance?, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 1573, 1575-76, 1581
(2013) (finding that banks with a higher percentage of independent directors performed
worse); David Finegold et al., Corporate Boards and Company Performance: Review of
Research in Light of Recent Reforms, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT'L REV. 865, 867 (2007)
("The many empirical studies that have examined the impact of the insider-outsider ratio
on boards have found no consistent evidence to suggest that increasing the percentage
of outsiders on the board will enhance performance. If anything, they suggest that
pushing too far to remove inside and affiliated directors may harm firm performance by
depriving boards of the valuable firm and industry-specific knowledge they provide.").
186. Baum, supranote 19, at 31.
187. Even that is not always clear. See, e.g., Kathleen Boozang, Does an
Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 90
(2007) (noting that the New York Stock Exchange's board was technically independent
when Richard Grasso resigned in 2003 amid a scandal over his pay, but many directors
were Grasso's friends).
188. Jonathan H. Gabriel, Note, Misdirected? Potential Issues with Reliance on
Independent Directors for Prevention of Corporate Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 641,
653 (2005).
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explained, "our law also cannot assume-absent some proof of the
point-that corporate directors are, as a general matter, persons of
unusual social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions that
social norms generate for ordinary folk."

89

Outside directors can also be co-opted to participate in the
corruption itself. For instance, a study of executive and director
compensation found that "outside directors were involved as much if
not more so than the executives in compensation manipulation
games."190 Although director compensation may only be a mere
fraction of the compensation that outside directors receive from their
full-time employment or other positions, they still would prefer to
receive more rather than less and this creates a conflict of interest. 9 1
As a result, outside directors are less likely to complain when a general
mechanism-such as backdating option grants-applies to them as
well as to the senior executives. As the study concluded, "independent
directors ... are not necessarily immune from temptations of financial
fraud."1 92

Further hindering their effectiveness, independent directors face
disincentives to investigate corruption and fraud. Acting as a watchdog
against fraud may hurt an independent director's future career
prospects.' 9 3 Outside directors of firms that have been accused of
financial fraud are less likely to secure outside directorships at other
firms, with one study finding that these outsiders suffer a 50 percent
reduction in the number of their directorships and, for those who
already serve on multiple boards, 96 percent lost at least one
directorship within three years of the lawsuit.1 9 4 Outside directors may
also be concerned about personal liability,1 95 which paradoxically may
cause them either to resign when they see signs of fraud or ignore them
rather than probe deeper.1 96 Given that outside directors already lack
the time, knowledge, and incentives to keep managers in line, it is hard

189. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
190. S. Burcu Avci et al., Do Independent Directors Curb FinancialFraud: The
Evidence and Proposalsfor FurtherReform, 93 IND. L.J. 757, 800 (2018)
191. See, e.g., Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of
Law: Enron, FinancialFraud and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1606-07
(2002) (describing Enron's substantial director compensation packages as a source of
conflict).
192. Avci, supra note 190, at 2.
193. Curtis & Hopkins, supra note 21, at 1-2; see Baum, supra note 19, at 32 ("In
general, however, there seem to be negative incentives for independent directors when
it comes to encouraging companies to investigate possible misbehavior.").
194. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, FinancialFraud, DirectorReputation, and
Shareholder Wealth, 86 J. FIN. EcON. 306, 307 (2007).
195. This may be true even though outside directors face little risk of true "out-ofpocket" liability. Bernard Black et al., Outside DirectorLiability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055,
1059 (2006).
196. Ridiger Fahlenbrach et al., The Dark Side of Outside Directors:Do They Quit
When They are Most Needed? (22 Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
15917, 2010).
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to expect them take much personal risk to do so.197 Indeed, Urska
Velikonja has argued that institutional investors understand that
independent directors are ineffective in reducing fraud or improving
performance, but have pushed for them in order to forestall more
substantive corporate governance reforms that might interfere with
their own expropriation. 198
B. Obstacles to FIFA's Reliance upon the Independent DirectorModel
Even if the benefits of independent directors for US public
corporations outweigh the costs, it is not clear that the analogous move
to more outsiders in FIFA will offer the same benefits. As Francois
Carrard, the chair of the FIFA Reform Task Force, noted, "[w]e have to
be very careful and refrain from over-simplistic, Western ideas about
corporate governance."1 9 9 Although FIFA's annual revenues might
make it appear to be like a major US public corporation, its governance
structure differs in important respects.
Most notably, FIFA is a nonprofit corporation. Nonprofits have the
20 0
but they lack the
same board structure as for-profit corporations,
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be
could
they
Theoretically,
well.
accountability as
by various stakeholder groups such as donors, clients, staff, or the
communities interested in the services they provide. 20 2 In practice,
however, those groups have differing and often competing goals,
freeing the board of any kind of clear metric by which the
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that many members "felt that its provisions would be ineffective in

197.
198.

Gabriel, supra note 188, at 646.
Velikonja, supra note 182, at 915-16.

199.

PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 209.

200. Lumen N. Mulligan, What's Good for the Goose is Not Good for the Gander:
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1984 (2007).
201. George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance Without Shareholders: A
CautionaryLesson from Non-Profit Organizations,39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 96 (2014). But
see Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals:The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit
and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y. L. SCH. REV. 457, 460-61 (1996)
(suggesting that nonprofits are more similar to for-profits than different with donors able
to exercise "voice" and "exit" rights similar to shareholders).
202. Brody, Agents Without Principals,supra note 201, at 461.
203. Mulligan, supra note 200, at 1986.
204. Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the
Gaps Between Law and Practice,76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521, 530 (2007) [hereinafter Brody,
Board].
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preventing intentional abuses, while presenting a burdensome or
inconvenient requirement." 205
One might protest that FIFA is distinguishable from the average
public charity. In some respects, it resembles a mutual benefit or
membership organization. These are voluntary associations organized
exclusively for the benefit of their members, which in this case would
be the national federations that make up the FIFA Congress and the
regional confederations that are represented in the FIFA Council. 2 06
In some cases, statutes governing nonprofits in the United States
consider members to be a form of "shareholder-substitutes" for
governance purposes. 20 7
Even here, however, FIFA can only at best claim to be a hybrid of
the mutual benefit organization. Each national football association
does have a vote on the president and certain other matters sent to the
FIFA Congress, but they do not vote on the composition of the FIFA
Council, or FIFA's equivalent of the board of directors, per se. They
only have indirect input on board composition through their voting
membership in their respective regional confederations, but they have
no say on the board members submitted by other confederations. 208 As
Alan Tomlinson observed, the "Congress has done little of serious
substance beyond the acclamation or election of the presiden[cy] every
four years." 2 09 Although the FIFA Congress has since been delegated
the important task of voting for the World Cup hosts and approving
the members of the Audit and Compliance, Governance, and Ethics
Committees submitted by the council, 2 10 Tomlinson's statement
largely continues to be true given the power of the council and the
regional confederations.
Perhaps more importantly in distinguishing between FIFA and
for-profit corporations is that FIFA is not subject to what corporate
governance experts refer to as a "proportional sharing" requirement. 21 1
In for-profit corporations, the board may not discriminate between
individual shareholders in making distributions. 212 Rather,
distributions of profits to shareholders holding the same class of stock
must be in proportion to the shareholders' investments in the

205. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.13 cmt. (1987). Independent
directors were similarly urged in connection with the drafting of the Third edition of the
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act in 2007 and in other best practices guides. Boozang,
supra note 187, at 83-84.
206. See Ira Mark Ellman, On Developing a Law of Nonprofit Corporations,1979
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 153, 154 (1979) (distinguishing mutual benefit corporations from public
benefit corporations).
207. Brody, Board, supra note 204, at 555-56.
208. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 154, at 7.
209. TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 30.
210. 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 154, at 38.
211. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and ProductionFunctions:
An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469, 494
(1979).
212. Id.
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3
corporation.2 1 Given the absence of any nonpecuniary benefits that
they might allocate to individual shareholders, this "severely restricts
the opportunities for any individual shareholder or group of
shareholders to reallocate wealth away from other shareholders to
themselves."2 1 4 As a result, shareholders in a for-profit corporation, at
least to the extent that they aren't blockholders with majority control,
are more likely to vote for what is in the best interests of the
corporation because that will also produce the greatest benefit for
themselves.
FIFA is a nonprofit corporation and therefore does not distribute
2 15
but it does have benefits to distribute as
profits to investors, per se,
it sees fit. It provides hosting rights to individual nations for FIFA
competitions such as the World Cup, and it has development funds that
it hands out to allow national football associations to pursue individual
projects. 21 6 Since it is not subject to a proportional sharing constraint,
though, it can treat national association members differently from each
other. That means that the voting decisions of those member
associations can be influenced by individual promises and benefits
rather than by their assessment of what is best for the organization as
a whole. Indeed, corruption may be in the best interest of the members
if the managers participating in the illegal activity still bring them the
desired result. That severely limits the extent to which member
nations can serve as shareholder substitutes for purposes of overseeing
outsiders named to the FIFA Council.

IV. HARNESSING THE POWER OF INSIDERS

The move to appoint outsiders to key positions at FIFA in order to
reform the organization is ironic considering that most of the key
information that led to the fall of the House of FIFA came from
insiders. Even the key outside groups pressuring FIFA to reform-the
U.S. Department of Justice and the media- relied primarily on insider
217
In this sense, insiders have been
informants to make their case.
the culture of corruption than
change
more powerful agents to forcibly
brought into FIFA for the
been
have
the outsiders that supposedly
same purpose.
The role of insiders in bringing about change in FIFA suggests
that rather than focusing on bringing in more outsiders to oversee
encourage
better
to
ways
find
should
reformers
FIFA,
in
wrongdoers
on
whistle"
the
"blow
who
insiders
"whistleblowers," or

213.
214.
215.
216.
programs,
217.

Id.
Id.
TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 29.
See id. at 108-11, 121-25 (describing competitions and
such as the Goal Project and the Football for Hope Initiative).
See infra text accompanying notes 296-312.
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their organization. 218 Although whistleblowing programs are not
without their problems and would require customization for the FIFA
environment, they may hold more promise for effecting radical change
than the current approach of relying upon outsiders as a magic reform
bullet.
A. Whistleblowers
In recent years, whistleblowers have been one of the most effective
tools in the fight against corporate fraud and corruption. 219 According
to one study of the 216 reported instances of fraud in large public
corporations in America between 1996 and 2004, 17 percent of the
cases were uncovered as a result of reports by employee
whistleblowers-more than any other source of information such as the
SEC, accountants, financial regulators, or the media. 220 On a global
basis, the evidence is even stronger for the power of employee
whistleblowers. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
examined fraud cases in over twenty countries and found that over 51
percent of them were reported by employees. 22 1 Similarly, the global
accounting firm KPMG performed an analysis of 456 instances of fraud
in organizations located in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and
found that whistleblowers and nonemployee tipsters (such as suppliers
and customers) were responsible for detection 52 percent of the time,
with internal audits being "much less important." 222 As business
ethicist Muel Kaptein concluded, "[e]mployees are a critical,
increasingly important source for detecting wrongdoing." 223

218. Klaus Ulrich Schmolke & Verena Utikal, Whistleblowing Incentives and
SituationalDeterminants2 (FAU Discussion Papers in Econ. No. 09/2016, 2016).
219. See SIMON WOLFE ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR FREE SPEECH, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION LAWS IN G20 COUNTRIES: PRIORITIES FOR ACTION 10 (2014)

("Whistleblowing is now considered to be among the most effective, if not the most
effective means to expose and remedy corruption, fraud and other types of wrongdoing
in the public and private sectors."); Olivia Dixon, Honesty Without Fear? Whistleblower
Anti-Retaliation Protections in Corporate Codes of Conduct, 40 MELBOURNE UNIV. L.

REV. 168, 169 (2016) ("Over the past decade whistleblowers have emerged as an integral
component of corporate governance through the monitoring and control of agency costs
in large public companies.").
220. Dyck et al., supra note 60, at 2225; see Jane Norberg, Keynote Address, What
Would We Do Without Them: Whistleblowers in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 379, 390 (2018) (stating in 2016, sixty-five percent
of individuals receiving awards under the SEC's whistleblower program were insiders of
the corporation about which they were providing information).
221. See ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 26 (2016) (finding that, in a survey of over forty

thousand certified fraud examiners around the world, employees provided 51.5 percent
of all tips, which is the most common means by which fraud is uncovered).
222.

KPMG,

GLOBAL

PROFILES

OF

THE

FRAUDSTER

14

(2016),

https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/05/profiles-of-the-fraudster.pdf
[https://perma.ccYB8C-BS8Z] (archived Feb. 4, 2019).
223. Muel Kaptein, From Inaction to External Whistleblowing: The Influence of the
Ethical Culture of Organizationson Employee Responses to Observed Wrongdoing, 98 J.
BUS. ETHICS 513, 513 (2011).
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There are a variety of reasons insiders have become so critical to
the success of any corporate governance reform. Perhaps the most
important is that insiders have better access to information than
outsiders. 224 They have spent years in the environment and are aware
of the techniques being used to facilitate the fraud or corruption. As
Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi Zingales observed, employees
"gather a lot of relevant information as a byproduct of their normal
work ... and are in a much better position to identify fraud than short
sellers, security regulators, or lawyers, for whom detecting fraud is like
looking for a needle in a haystack." 225 Consequently, they are the most
22 6
Dyck and his colleagues
likely to be aware that it is taking place.
rather than relying
information
inside
to
access
"having
found that
probability of
actor's
an
increases
information
solely on public
227
Not surprisingly,
detecting fraud by 15 percentage points."
employees are often in possession of information about wrongdoing in
an organization. According to the 2013 National Business Ethics
Survey, 41 percent of employees observed misconduct on the job in
their company during the previous year, and that number has been as
high as 55 percent in 2007 when many American companies had yet to
22 8
Jane Norberg, the Chief of the
get serious about ethics compliance.
Office of the Whistleblower in the SEC's Division of Enforcement,
described corporate insiders as "an extremely valuable category of
whistleblower" noting that "approximately sixty-five percent of award
recipients [in the SEC award program] were insiders of the entity
about which they reported." 229 Norberg explained that "this is because
and can help propel
they often have firsthand knowledge of wrongdoing 230
insights."
and
evidence
their
with
investigation
an
By contrast, outsiders "must rely upon information they receive
2 31
This
from corporate executives to fulfill their monitoring function."
same
these
Moreover,
fraud.
detect
to
ability
their
naturally limits
corporate executives have an interest in presenting the corporation in
the best light when conveying it to the outsiders, which can
intentionally or unintentionally conceal any possible fraud. As
Professor Richard Moberly observed, "[e]ven under the best
circumstances, this information is certain to be incomplete and self-

224. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2006) [hereinafter Moberly,
Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel].
225. Dyck et al., supra note 60, at 2214.
226. See Gladys Lee & Neil Fargher, Companies' Use of Whistle-Blowing to Detect
Fraud:An Examination of Corporate Whistle-Blowing Policies, 114 J. BUS. ETHICS 283,
283 (2013).
227. Dyck et al., supranote 60, at 2215.
228.

ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S.

WORKFORCE 12-13 (2013), https://www.ibe.org.uk/userassets/surveys/nbes20l3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9N4-ZMMZ] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
229. Norberg, supra note 220, at 390.
230. Id.
231. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel, supra note 224, at 1114.
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serving due to information blocking and filtering by executives and
subordinate managers."23 2 Of course, if the executives are
participating in the fraud themselves, then they "may affirmatively
hide or misrepresent information in order to evade a monitor's
oversight." 233
In theory, insiders also have a greater incentive than outsiders to
"blow the whistle" on wrongdoers than pure outsiders. Insiders are
often invested in a company both in terms of the time spent at the
company and in terms of the emotional investment in the people at the
company. If fraud or corruption is allowed to fester, they suffer
disproportionately compared to outsiders, who may only serve parttime as directors in the company. Moreover, in the case of "true
believers," or employees who work in the organization or the profession
because of its unique mission, corporate fraud may be seen as a threat
to that mission and lead them to blow the whistle. 234 This may be the
case in the for-profit world as well. One case study that surveyed the
attitudes of employees of a financial institution in Ireland toward five
scenarios of misconduct found that where employees indicated a
willingness to blow the whistle, it was out of "a sense of responsibility
to their organisation and their customers . .. rather than any hope of
personal gain via promotion or peer respect."2 3 5 Siddhartha Dasgupta
and Ankit Kesharwani describe this as "rational loyalty," not so much
to the "top management and employees of an organization but towards
the mission statement, goals, value statements and codes of conduct of
the organization." 2 36 Alternatively, whistleblowers may feel uniquely
guilty about standing by while in possession of evidence of the fraud.
Whistleblowing in this situation operates as a form of "conscience

232. Id.; see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1350
(2005) ("[T]he independent board is reliant upon the CEO for information with respect
to his own performance, information that can easily be manipulated or suppressed by
the CEO because of his position as the sole source of information.").
233. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model, supra note 224, at 1115.
234. See, e.g., MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE
WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 70 (1989)

(describing the "ethical resisters" who, "[w]hen asked to subordinate [their] values to
meet the requirements of the bureaucracy . . . conjure . . . up a 'red line,' a point they

could not cross."); Dasgupta & Kesharwani, supra note 59, at 6 (discussing the "altruistic
concerns," including "the desire to correct the wrongdoing which is harming the interests
of the organization itself, the consumers, the co-workers and the society at large," that
motivate whistleblowers).
235. Conor Buckley et al., Empirical Evidence of Lack of Significant Support for
Whistleblowing, 7 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 275, 281 (2010).
236. Dasgupta & Kesharwani, supra note 59, at 6; see Symposium, What Would
We Do Without Them: Whistleblowers in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, 23
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 379, 414 (2018) [hereinafter Symposium] (noting that
whistleblowers are often "very loyal employees who are extremely concerned about
wrongdoing going on in the workplace and want to alert upper management to those
concerns").
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cleansing" for an insider who feels complicit in the wrongdoing by
virtue of his or her employment. 237
The risk in relying upon insiders to report misconduct is that they
may be motivated by a personal grudge. In other words, they might be
"unhappy for reasons unconnected with the firms planned
noncompliance with the regulation, but opportunistic in blowing the
whistle when so doing creates sufficiently substantial discomfort (cost)
for their employer." 2 38 They are "punishment motivated" in this
2 39
scenario, either against their supervisor or the company as a whole.
The concern is that this reduces the credibility of the evidence provided
by the whistleblower. Studies, however, suggest that this concern may
be overblown, finding that, given the personal costs involved,
whistleblowing is rarely undertaken in a way that is "frivolous,
240
misleading, or unreliable."
B. Disincentives to Whistleblowing
Paradoxically, notwithstanding the benefit whistleblowers
provide to an organization, its managers often are hostile to them.
According to one report of whistleblowing in the G20 countries,
"government and corporate employees who report wrongdoing to their
managers or to regulators can face dismissal, harassment and other
forms of retribution." 24 1 Even if they are not fired outright, their
credibility is attacked, they receive poor evaluations and are denied
promotions, they are threatened with termination, they are isolated or
humiliated, they are assigned burdensome extra work, or they are
threatened with prosecution for stealing company documents or
sensitive information. 242 The Dyck study found that in 82 percent of
those cases involving nonanonymous employee whistleblowers the
employee reported that they were "fired, quit under duress, or had
significantly altered responsibilities as a result of bringing the fraud to
light." 24 3 Whistleblowers who are fired or driven from their jobs are

237. Anthony Heyes & Sandeep Kapur, An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower, 25
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 157, 158 (2009); see C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers and the Narrative
of Ethics, 32 J. Soc. PHIL. 402, 405 (2001) (saying whistleblowers reported that they
acted "because I couldn't live with myself if I hadn't done anything . .. I have to look at
myself in the mirror every morning[.]").
238. Heyes & Kapur, supra note 237, at 166.
239. Id.; see Jonathan R. Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud:A Theoretical
Analysis of Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1907 (2007).
240. Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle Blowing: Target Firm Characteristicsand
Economic Consequences, 85 AcCT. REV. 1239, 1242 (2010). The general view is that all
claims should be investigated, rather than discounting ex ante because of concerns about
the reporter's motivation, and if some claims are baseless, that is simply "the price we
have to pay internally in corporations in order to get that one in however many meritbased claims." Symposium, supra note 236, at 427.
241. WOLFE ET AL., supra note 219, at 1.
242. Dasgupta & Kesharwani, supra note 59, at 8.
243. Dyck et al., supra note 60, at 2216. In one example of a significantly altered
job assignment, a scientist in the U.S. Interior Department claimed that he was
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often blacklisted from ever working again in the same field or
industry. 24 4 Adding insult to injury, executives also manage to
suppress or disregard whistleblower reports, 2 45 resulting in the
whistleblower suffering immense personal cost for no tangible benefit
in revealing fraud and misconduct.
Why have employers traditionally been hostile to whistleblowers
despite evidence that illegal acts and misconduct are typically
correlated with declining performance by the firm? 246 To put it

differently, if whistleblowing is potentially good for companies, why
aren't companies more supportive of whistleblowers? The typical
explanation is that whistleblowers are perceived to be disloyal to the
organization. 24 7 As one study reported, "[a]lthough technically holding
the moral high ground, whistleblowers have traditionally been
regarded as spies in the camp, demonstrating disloyalty to the very
organisations that have given them employment." 248 More than simple
disloyalty, the act of whistleblowing is seen as a challenge to the
organization itself. It "represents a challenge to the organization's
authority structure and therefore threatens its basic mode of
operation." 249 As Myron and Penina Glazer found after interviewing
sixty-four whistleblowers over a six-year period, "[flrom their
superiors' perspective, the resisters had not uncovered serious
breaches of policy but had rather involved themselves in actions
against the very bureaucratic hierarchy that had hired them and
provided good salaries and accoutrements of a respected position." 2 50
In effect, from management's perspective, the whistleblower is

reassigned to an accounting job as retaliation for speaking out about the dangers of
climate change for Alaska native communities. Joel Clement, I'm a scientist. I'm
blowing the whistle on the Trump administration,WASH. POST (July 19, 2017).
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-a-scientist-the-trump-administrationreassigned-me-for-speaking-up-about-climate-change/2017/07/19/389b8dce-6b12- 1 1e79cl5-177740635e83story.html?tid=ss-tw-bottom&utm-term=.df9ddOedc6a.
[https://perma.cc/6L52-MARW] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
244. See Alford, supra note 237, at 403 (in interviews with a dozen whistleblowers
over a year, "all but one lost not just his or her job, but his or her career."); Rapp, supra
note 62, at 114 (reporting that sixty-four percent of whistleblowers in one study claimed
to have been blacklisted by other employers in their fields).
245. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel, supra note 224, at 1121.
246. Near & Miceli, OrganizationalDissidence, supra note 59, at 1. Some suggest
that the traditional view of employers is starting to change and their perception of
whistleblowers has begun to improve. Buckley et al., supra note 235, at 277.
247. See, e.g., Dasgupta & Kesharwani, supra note 59, at 5 ("[W]histleblowing has
been seen as an action against the interests of the organization. Whistleblowers face
sanctions from the organization as well as their colleagues for their act as, [sic] it is seen
to be disloyal towards the organization."); Rapp, supra note 62, at 115 ("[W]histleblowing
is often equated with disloyal 'snitching."').
248. Buckley et al., supra note 235, at 275.
249. Near & Miceli, OrganizationalDissidence, supra note 59, at 4.
250. GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 234, at 133.
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breaching the duties of "organizational citizenship," which consist of
25 1
being obedient, loyal, and participatory in the organization.
Another part of the impulse to retaliate is to discredit the
whistleblower as a potential witness. The Glazers observed that
"[w]hile it may seem to take the form of personal revenge by superiors,
retaliation is, in fact, part of a rational and planned process initiated
25 2
by an organization to destroy the resister's credibility as a witness."
To accomplish this, "management often invokes such harsh measures
as blacklisting, dismissal, transfer, and personal harassment, which
2 53
Companies claim that
far exceed the ostensible provocation."
issues," further
addiction
or
health
"mental
have
whistleblowers
254
credibility.
damaging their
Regardless of why it occurs, the bottom line is that retaliation
imposes a direct cost to an employee whistleblower, while the benefits
from reporting the misconduct are indirect and primarily benefit the
25 5
Thus, it is not
organization or society rather than the whistleblower.
employees
for
deterrent
strong
a
provide
costs
the
surprising that
data
survey
on
based
Studies
whistleblowers.
becoming
about
thinking
saw
who
employees
of
percent
40
than
more
have found that
2 56
is
particularly
This
it.
report
to
failed
workplace
misconduct in the
true for employees with less seniority or who are lower down in the
organizational chart, who often refrain from reporting misconduct by
those above them. 25 7 Professor Richard Moberly reported that in cases
like Enron involving financial misconduct, "[c]ountless lower-level
employees necessarily knew about, were exposed to, or were
superficially involved in the wrongdoing and its concealment, but few
25 8
Even for
disclosed it, either to company officials or to the public."

-

251. Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 437-38 (2009).
252. GLAZER & GLAZER, supra note 234, at 134.
253. Id.
29,
254. Jayne O'Donnell, Whistle-blowers form a breed apart, USA TODAY (July
29
20 04
-0 7 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/
whistle-blower-main x.htm [https://perma.ccl7PND-UBGT] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
255. See Eileen Z. Taylor & Mary B. Curtis, An Examination of the Layers of
Workplace Influences in Ethical Judgments: Whistleblower Likelihood and Perseverance
in Public Accounting, 93 J. Bus. ETHICS 21, 22 (2010); see also Dixon, supra note 219, at
173 ("[W]hile society, shareholders and employees all benefit positively from such
disclosure and face negligible downside risk, a whistleblower is often typecast as a snitch
who 'betrays a sacred trust largely for personal gain' and faces a very real threat of
retaliation.") (internal citations omitted).
256. Buckley et al., supra note 235, at 278 (citing studies finding a 44 percent
report rate for lower-level employees and a 47 percent report rate for employees
generally); Jingyu Gao et al., Whistleblowing Intentions of Lower-Level Employees: The
Effect of Reporting Channel, Bystanders, and Wrongdoer Power Status, 126 J. Bus.
ETHICS 85, 88 (2015) (citing an Ethics Resource Center study that found a reporting rate
of 42 percent).
257. Gao et al., supranote 256, at 86; Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Chockalingam
Viswesvaran, Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of
Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation, 62 J. Bus. ETHICS 277, 285 (2005).
258. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel, supra note 224, at 1108.
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those employees who do have the courage to come forward, many report
that "if I had to do it over again, I wouldn't." 259
C. Whistleblower Reforms
The question is how do authorities overcome the reticence of
individuals to be whistleblowers? To facilitate whistleblowing,
governments have typically resorted to one or both of two types of
statutory or regulatory reforms. These include (1) protecting
whistleblowers ex post from threats of retaliation from superiors in
their companies; and (2) encouraging whistleblowing ex ante by
creating an avenue, and even an affirmative duty, to report for those
in possession of information relating to misconduct within the firm
and/or offering incentives, such as "bounties." 260
1. Anti-retaliation Protection
Laws have been used to protect whistleblowers in the United
States since at least the Civil War, when President Lincoln pushed
through the False Claims Act in 1863 to protect against fraud by
government suppliers during the war.26 ' Since then, Congress has
adopted provisions protecting federal employees who reported waste or
fraud in federal agencies under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
and its successor, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.262
Congress also adopted similar provisions protecting employees who
reported misconduct involving public corporations under the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,263 both of which were part of a spate
of at least nine new federal anti-retaliation provisions enacted over the
span of a decade. 2 64
Despite their prevalence, and even necessity, anti-retaliation laws
have not been considered highly effective at protecting whistleblowers.
Indeed, in a study of whistleblower suits filed under Sarbanes-Oxley
in the first three years after its passage, a mere 3.6 percent of
employees won relief.265 Moreover, at least one study found that

retaliation actually increased after anti-retaliation laws were enacted,

259. Dyck et al., supra note 60, at 2216.
260. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 62, at 10;
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1151, 1159-60 (2010).
261.

ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS AND WHY 94-95

(2003); Goel & Nelson, supra note 60, at 2331.
262. JOHNSON, supra note 261, at 105; NEAR & MICELI, Wrongdoing, supra note
64, at 264; Goel & Nelson, supra note 60, at 2331.
263. Pope & Lee, supra note 60, at 597-98.
264. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions,supra note 62, at 12.
265. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 62, at 67.
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266
possibly because the likelihood of punishment was relatively slim.
Nevertheless, even the mere adoption of a whistleblowing program
that protects against retaliation may have a salutary influence on an
organization. Professor Olivia Dixon notes that whistleblower

protection policies can be "expressive in character .

.

. [they] not only

set a benchmark, causing some companies to alter or modify their
behavior, but by diffusing norms, they positively influence
organizational behavior and culture."267
2. Facilitating and Encouraging Whistleblowing
If anti-retaliation protection provisions are the Version 1.0 of
whistleblower reforms, measures to facilitate and incentivize
whistleblowing are the Version 2.0 of such reforms. These include
creating safe avenues to receive whistleblower reports, which is
of encouraging
model"
"structural
the
called
sometimes
whistleblowing, and introducing incentives to file those reports, which
268
In both cases, the goal is to
is sometimes called the "bounty model."

proactively seek out reports on misconduct rather than simply reduce
the expected costs on the back end for those who do happen to come
forward.
In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress adopted the structural model by
requiring public corporations' audit committees, which are staffed with
independent directors, to establish procedures by which they will
receive whistleblower reports, including from sources who wish to
remain anonymous. 2 69 As a supplement or backstop to permitting
anonymous reporting, some firms also allow for external reporting of
misconduct to an independent third-party. 270 External reporting
options often appear to be better than internal options, at least for
271
This allows them
employees who are not in management positions.
be personally
might
who
a
supervisor
to
not
and
to report anonymously
supervisor
the
which
to
a
department
to
or
misconduct
involved in the
whistleblower.
of
the
identity
the
determine
to
access
have
might
Nevertheless, some studies have found that external reporting where
anonymity was not maintained actually increased the risk of
retaliation, presumably because "the use of an external channel is
likely to be interpreted as a threat to the organization's structure and

266. See Marcia P. Miceli et al., Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers? Results of a
Naturally Occurring Field Experiment, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 129, 149 (1999)
(finding that although the incidence of perceived wrongdoing after anti-retaliation laws
were passed decreased, non-anonymous whistleblowers actually suffered more
retaliation).
267. Dixon, supra note 219, at 172.
268. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel, supra note 224, at 1108-09 n.5.
269. Id. at 1138 (citing § 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley).
270. Gao et al., supra note 256, at 88.
271. Id. at 86.
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legitimate authority." 272 It is literally going outside the chain-ofcommand, to use a military analogy. For that reason, many
whistleblowers would prefer to report internally. 273 It comports with
their view that whistleblowing is fundamentally an act of loyalty
toward their organization and allows them to register their disapproval
of corporate misconduct that threatens the organization. 274
In Dodd-Frank, Congress addressed the incentives part of the
equation by instituting a system for providing financial rewards to
whistleblowers who provided information related to potential
violations of securities or commodities laws. 275 Although the bounty
regime has deep roots within the United States, it is fairly uncommon
as a statutory method in jurisdictions around the world. 276 Moreover,
few companies have adopted their own internal bounty program.
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, a mere 11
percent of organizations around the world employ some sort of
financial incentive to encourage whistleblowing. 277 Nevertheless, the
theory underlying bounty programs is appealing. Providing a reward
helps to compensate whistleblowers and thereby overcome the
hesitation they might feel toward coming forward because of the
retaliation and other costs they might suffer.27 8 The SEC reports that
its dual system of protection and awards has led to a 40 percent
increase in the number of tips each year. 2 79 Those tips have proven
useful as well, evidenced by the $57 million in awards made in 2016
alone, which exceeded all award amounts in previous years
combined.28 0
Both the structural and bounty models have spread to other parts
of federal law. For instance, under the Internal Revenue Code, a
whistleblower may receive between 15 and 30 percent of the collected
proceeds depending upon the extent to which he contributed to the
detection of the underpayment. 281 Although only an individual may file

272. See Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, supra note 257, at 293 (noting, however,
that the risk that the retaliation would also be reported may account for the fact that the
correlation was smaller than expected).
273. See Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's StructuralModel, supra note 224, at 1142 ("A
disclosure channel also harmonizes with a whistleblower's tendency to report misconduct
internally[.]").
274. Id.
275. David Freeman Engstrom, Bounty Regimes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 3 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2017); Pope & Lee,

supra note 60, at 598.
276. See Lydia Mechtenberg et al., Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and
Experimental Evidence 3 (Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper IZA DP
No. 10607, 2017).
277. See id. at 7 n.13 (citing ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS,
REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE (2014)).

278. But see Feldman & Lobel, supra note 260, at 1206 (suggesting that, at least
for low level misconduct, bounties might reduce reporting because they take the ethical
outrage that motivates most whistleblowing out of the equation).
279. Norberg, supra note 220, at 389.
280. Id.
281. 28 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2018).
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2 82
which
a whistleblower claim with the Internal Revenue Service,
rules out filings made anonymously through a trust or a nominee, the
service does promise to protect the identity of the whistleblower to the
fullest extent possible. 28 3 Moreover, if a whistleblower seeks to
challenge a denial of a claim for the proceeds, he may petition the Tax
Court to proceed anonymously. 284 The Tax Court has even permitted
individuals to proceed anonymously in challenges to a denial of the
award where the whistleblower can demonstrate that the potential
harm to themselves would outweigh the people's right to know who is
285
using their court system.
One of the concerns about whistleblower protections and

incentives

is that they

encourage

28 6
false or fabricated claims.

.

Bounties, for example, may incentivize employees to make
questionable claims in the hopes of reaping a financial reward.
Professor Yhonatan Givati developed a model to assess the risks and
rewards of whistleblowing and concluded that financial rewards "may
encourage false reports." 287 Even an anti-retaliation regime can
arguably encourage false claims if 'low-performing individuals . .
knowingly lodge false reports with the sole motivation of being
28 8
sheltered from unfavorable actions such as dismissal."
Although the risk of false claims is real, it may be overblown.
First, the logistical obstacles to collecting on a false claim and the high
costs of pursuing any kind of whistleblower action "make genuinely
groundless claims highly unlikely." 289 Second, the risk can be
mitigated. Some provisions protect against the risk of such false claims
by conditioning protection or reward on information ultimately proven
to be factual, rather than merely believed by the whistleblower to be

282. See Claims Submitted to the IRS Whistleblower Office Under Section 7623:
Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253.
283. Confidentialityand Disclosurefor Whistleblowers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
(last visited
https://www.irs.gov/uac/confidentiality-and-disclosure-for-whistleblowers
Jan. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/LVV3-Z5AV] (archived Jan. 31, 2019).
284. U.S. TAX CT. R. PRACTICE & P. 345(a).
285. See Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 183, 205 (2011)
(noting that the public's interest in the identity of the anonymous whistleblower is
relatively weak when there is a strong societal interest in concealing their identity and
no concern of illegitimate motives); see also Whistleblower 10949-13W v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2014-94 at *1, n.1 (permitting anonymity in a case involving organized crime
members where the whistleblower had received a death threat). But see Whistleblower
14377-16W v. Commissioner, 148 T.C. 510, 518-19 (2017) (denying the whistleblower's
petition to proceed anonymously in part because of status as a repeat whistleblower with
denied claims).
286. Mechtenberg et al., supra note 276, at 2, 7.
287. Yehonatan Givati, A Theory of Whistleblower Rewards, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 43,
70 (2016).
288. Mechtenberg et al., supra note 276, at 2.
289. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get
Rich: FinancialIncentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV.
273, 326 (1992) (analyzing the possibility of groundless claims under the False Claims
Act).
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true. 290 This effectively deters whistleblowers from coming forward
without hard evidence. Other tools for minimizing the risk of false
reports include (1) limiting rewards to cases involving high amount
recoveries, such as $1 million in the case of Dodd-Frank; (2) excluding
individuals who obtain information from secondary sources that are
publicly available; and (3) reducing the reward percentage for
individuals with a higher propensity to make a false claim, such as a
competitor. 29 1
A second concern is that employers may try to undercut programs
that encourage whistleblowing because of the potential damage to the
organization. 292 For example, Health Net, an insurance company,
created a severance agreement in which employees not only were not
encouraged to blow the whistle on securities violations, but they were
forced to waive their right to receive any financial incentives for
whistleblowing if they signed the severance agreement. 293 In effect, the
company recognized that financial rewards were a powerful incentive
and, before being caught by the SEC and forced to end the practice, 294
sought to up the ante by using bigger rewards to try to silence potential
informants. Such agreements, however, are likely unenforceable and
the SEC has successfully pursued enforcement actions against
companies that have attempted this maneuver. 295

290. See Mechtenberg et al., supra note 276, at 1 (describing the difference
between a belief-based and fact-based system for protection).
291. Engstrom, supra note 275, at 9.
292. See Norberg, supra note 220, at 395 (noting that in several circumstances
"companies added restrictive language that required separating employees to waive any
right to recovery of incentives for reporting misconduct, including under the SEC's
whistleblower program, to receive their monetary separation payments from the firm.").
293. Melody Petersen, SEC Says Insurer Tried to Block Whistle-Blowers, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2016, at C2.
294. Id.
295. See In re BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making
Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order, SEC
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-17371, SEC Rel. No. 78528 (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78528.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCV5-8SJH]
(archived Feb. 8, 2019) (holding that BlueLinx must amend its employment and
severance contracts to protect the whistleblowing rights of employees); U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, BlackRock Charged With Removing Whistleblower Incentives in Separation
Agreements (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017- 14.html
[https://perma.cc/6FBJ-9T6E] (archived Feb. 8, 2019) (announcing a monetary penalty
assessed against BlackRock for improper use of separation agreements to silence
whistleblowers); Richard Moberly et al., De Facto Gag Clauses: The Legality of
Employment Agreements that Undermine Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Provisions, 30
ABA J. LABOR & EMP. L. 87, 89 (2014) (explaining that employers will add de facto gag
order provisions to their employment contracts through confidentiality agreements that
may violate Dodd-Frank); Jason Zuckerman, Panel Discussion, What Would We Do
Without Them: Whistleblowers in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, 23
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 379, 404-05 (2018) (describing employer use of "de facto gag
provisions" that have a "similar effect," such as broadly-worded non-disparagement
provisions that could include reporting to the SEC or other regulators).
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D. Utilizing Whistleblowers in FIFA
1. The Power of Whistleblowing in Football
There is little doubt that whistleblowers played a large role in
uncovering FIFA corruption and instigating reform legislation. In
2002, for instance, FIFA's Secretary-General Michael Zen-Ruffinen,
who had only recently announced his campaign to challenge Sepp
Blatter for the presidency, delivered a confidential report to the
Executive Committee in which he detailed a number of charges about
296
Zen-Ruffinen
legal and financial abuses under Blatter's leadership.
through the
network
whole
the
"manipulating
of
accused Blatter
of third
benefit
the
to
gained
he
power
administrative
and
material
2 97
corporate
many
Unlike
interests."
personal
his
and
persons
whistleblowers, Zen-Ruffinen certainly made no attempts to submit his
charges anonymously. Indeed, he held a press conference to announce
that he had filed a criminal complaint with the prosecutor's office in
Zurich alleging "misappropriation" or "unlawful use" of assets and
298
Many of these
"criminal mismanagement" of FIFA's resources.
a
written-off £6
including
confirmed,
ultimately
were
allegations
Committee
Integrity
a
CONCACAF
by
Warner,
Jack
to
loan
million
29 9
resignation.
Warner's
to
contributed
work
whose
Insiders were also instrumental in leaking information about
FIFA corruption to the media that was later used as part of
government investigations. In 2011, for instance, during the British
House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee's
hearings on World Cup bid rigging, it published a letter from Sunday
Times journalists that included previously unknown allegations from
English Football Association chairman Lord David Triesman, Michel
30 0
This type of
Zen-Ruffinen, and two African FIFA officials.
authorities to
led
of
what
part
was
also
media
the
to
whistleblowing
investigative
British
a
Jennings,
Andrew
place.
first
FIFA in the
reporter who has long pursued Sepp Blatter and FIFA officials,
reported being approached by a "high ranking FIFA official" several
weeks after asking Blatter at a press conference in 2002 whether he
had ever taken a bribe.30 1 In a midnight meeting, he was given "a whole
load of documents," many of which contained crucial information and
were ultimately handed over to the FBI in 2015 as part of the

296. CONN, supra note 39, at 69-70; TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 133.
297. TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 133.
298. CONN, supra note 39, at 70; TOMLINSON, supra note 44, at 133.
299. CONN, supra note 39, at 71, 138-49.
300. Id. at 95-96.
301. Ed Odeven, Jennings predicts jail time for Blatter, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 5,
2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2016/08/05/soccer/Jennings-predicts-jail-timeblatter/#.V6S5L6I2s6F [https://perma.cc/28NS-BMK9] (archived Feb. 8, 2019).
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investigation that led to the arrests and indictments of over forty FIFA
officials and the most recent round of FIFA reformS. 30 2
Perhaps the most infamous of all FIFA whistleblowers was Chuck
Blazer, an American who had served as general secretary of
CONCACAF and was a member of the FIFA Executive Committee for
decades.3 0 3 Although Blazer eventually became a confidential
informant against FIFA as part of plea bargain related to a criminal
case brought against him for tax evasion and other charges, 3 0 4 he was
originally a whistleblower against his boss at CONCACAF, Jack
Warner.3 0 5 In what Blazer might have characterized as a "conscience
cleansing" type of whistleblowing, 3 06 but what some speculate was a
plot by Blatter to push out a rival,3 0 7 Blazer revealed that in 2011
Warner and other delegates of the Caribbean Football Union each
received brown envelopes with $40,000 in cash from FIFA presidential
candidate Mohamed bin Hammam.3 0 8 A few weeks after Blazer's
report, FIFA suspended both Warner and bin Hammam.30 9 The latter
was ultimately banned from soccer activities for life and the former
resigned before receiving the same fate.310 As discussed earlier,3 1 1 the
events ultimately led to the first major FIFA reform effort.31 2
2. Resistance and Retaliation in FIFA
Although these whistleblower reports ultimately led FIFA to
consider reform, the more common reaction in FIFA has been to be
dismissive. In many cases, investigators have been slow to give their
allegations much credence. For example, Michael Garcia, thenchairman of the FIFA Ethics Committee's investigatory chamber,
dismissed information provided by numerous whistleblowers in his
report on the 2018/2022 World Cup bidding process (the Garcia
Report).31 3 The Garcia Report stated that a female member of the

302.
303.
304.
75-year

Id.; see supra Section II.B.
See generally PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11.
Rupert Neate, Chuck Blazer agreed to go undercoverat Fifa to avoid potential
sentence,

THE

GUARDIAN

(June

15,

2015),

https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/juni/15/chuck-blazer-fifa-ban-undercoverback-taxes-plea-deal [https://perma.cc/5BPX-WFDZ] (archived Feb. 8, 2019).
305. CONN, supranote 39, at 100.
306. See BENSINGER, supra note 2, at 71 (recounting that Blazer reportedly told
his attorney that "I just can't live with this" before reporting Warner and the bribes).
307. PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 125 ("Some FIFA watchers senses
a conspiracy, believing that Blatter knew about the plot from the start and let it continue
so he could expose-and oust-bin Hammam and Warner with Blazer's help.").
308. CONN, supra note 39, at 100-01.
309. PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 125.
310. Id.
311. See supra Part II.A.
312. Pielke Jr., An Evaluationof the FIFA GovernanceReform Process, supra note
9, at 197.
313.

FIFA ETHICS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE INQUIRY INTO THE 2018/2022 FIFA

WORLD CuP BIDDING PROCESS 58-61, 249-72 (2018), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/do
cument/affederati on/footballgovernance/02/89/ [hereinafter GARCIA REPORT].
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Australian 2022 bid team labeled "Australia Whistleblower," but later
3 14
provided information
identified by others as Bonita Mersiades,
about potential misconduct relating to Australia's bid for the 2022
World Cup, including money and other gifts transferred to Jack
Warner and people close to him in order to secure the vote of members
of the Caribbean Football Union.3 15 Despite acknowledging that
Mersiades "provided some useful information," the Garcia Report
declined to rely upon the information, citing inconsistencies, potential
bias toward the other members of the bid committee, and a possible
316
A
profit motive since she was writing a book about her experiences.
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2022
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the
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team labeled the "Qatar Whistleblower," but identified by others as
31 8
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Phaedra Almajid,3 17 was also rejected by the Garcia Report.
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to buy their votes.3 1 9 As with Mersiades, the Garcia Report declined to
rely upon the information because of concerns about Almajid's
credibility after she temporarily recanted in a public statement,
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she
that
acknowledging
despite
strongest
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"provided
that
journals
prepared
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320
support that her allegations were true."
Even worse than dismissing whistleblower reports, FIFA's
executives have been largely hostile toward whistleblowers. The
organization has been described as having a "culture of self321
Former
protection," particularly when it comes to whistleblowers.
322
whistleblowers,"
"slam[med]
recently
Blatter
Sepp
President
comparing them to "a snitch at school" and bluntly stating that "if you

87/97/aus-bel-ned eng-esp-por-jpnkor-qat-reportneutral.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9W67-TZ4H] (archived Feb. 8, 2019).
314. CONN, supra note 39, at 257, 259-60.
315. GARCIA REPORT, supranote 313, at 58-59.
316. Id. at 59-61. See MERSIADES, supra note 2, at dedication page. Ironically, or
perhaps because of, this comment in the Garcia Report, the book states that "100% of
the author's proceeds from the sale of this book will go to the Australian Sports
Foundation's fundraising campaign for the 'Pararoos to participate in the 2019 IFCPC
World Cup." Id.
317. CONN, supra note 39, at 96.
318. GARCIA REPORT, supranote 313, at 249-72.
319. Id. at 249-51.
320. Id. at 264.
321. John Sinnott, Whistle-blower: Woe betide anyone reporting 'FIFAcorruption',
CNN (Dec. 17, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/17/sport/football/fifa-whistleblowercorruption-phaedra-al-majidlindex.html [https://perma.cc/GUR7-BGXS] (archived Feb.
8, 2019); see also Jack Anderson, Fifaand other authoritiesfail to protect whistleblowers,
IRISH TIMES (Dec. 24, 2014), https://www.irishtimes.com/sportlother-sports/fifa-and[https://perma.cclTTY4other-authorities-fail-to-protect-whistleblowers- 1.2047873
HQYJ] (archived Feb. 8, 2019).
322. Aaron Gordon, Sepp Blatter Bolsters Credentials for FBI Director, Slams
Whistleblowers, VICE SPORTS (June 19, 2017), https://sports.vice.com/en-us/article/
ywz4ej/sepp-blatter-bolsters-credentials-for-fbi-director-slams-whistleblowers
[https://perma.cc/LH92-4263] (archived Feb. 8, 2019).
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are a whistleblower, it's not correct." 32 3 He even participated in such
retaliation personally according to Farah Weheliye Addo, the former
president of the Somali Football Association and vice president of the
Confederation of African Football, who alleged in 2002 that he was
offered $100,000 to support Blatter for FIFA president in 1998.324
According to Farah, Blatter bribed a referee from Niger to provide
damaging information about Farah that he presumably hoped to use
to damage his reputation.3 2 5
Most whistleblowers against FIFA appear to have suffered some
form of retaliation and harassment designed to get them to drop their
claims. The above-described case involving Phaedra Almajid is
illustrative of FIFA's hostility toward whistleblowers. The Garcia
Report had dismissed her testimony in part because she had recanted
it, but it acknowledged her claim that the recantation was prompted
by an alleged threat of a $1 million lawsuit against her by the Qatar
bid committee for breach of a confidentiality clause in her contract. 326
Almajid told reporter David Conn that she "felt terrified. I have two
kids, one is disabled; I was facing legal action and the loss of my income
too. I agree to sign that affidavit [recanting her testimony] and they
promised to release me from legal action." 3 27 The Garcia Report
dismissed that threat, though, on the basis of assertions of the
members of the Qatari bid committee themselves, 3 28 without any
consideration of their potential bias.
Mersiades offered a summary of the kinds of retaliation that she
and other whistleblowers against FIFA have suffered for coming
forward:
Many of us have paid a high price. We've lost jobs; we've lost livelihoods; we've
had illnesses; we've been abused by people who don't even know us; we've been

323. David Conn, Sepp Blatter after the fall: 'Why the hell should I bear all the
blame?', THE GUARDIAN (June 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2017/
jun/19/sepp-blatter-fifa-president-corruption- [https://perma.cc/74WY-HM3D] (archived
Feb. 8, 2019); see also MERSIADES, supra note 2, at 338. When informed that Mersiades
was a whistleblower, Blatter responded "'You have such an honest face,' he said. He
seemed taken aback by the concept of a whistleblower being honest." Id. His open vitriol
is not surprising considering that a whistleblower reportedly was assisting the Swiss
criminal investigation of his role in the FIFA case. See Nathaniel Vinton, 'Whistleblower'
helping investigation against Sepp Blatter, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/soccer/whistleblower-helping-investigation-seppblatter-article- 1.2513071 [https://perma.cc/GLC2-SW3S] (archived Feb. 8, 2019).
324. Ex-Somali FIFA official was first whistleblower to expose FIFA scandal,
SARAN
J.
(June
3,
2015),
http://sahanjournal.com/sepp-blatter-fifascandal/#.WYPBCGQyU1 [https://perma.cc/K3NU-UA7R] (archived Feb. 8, 2019)
[hereinafter Ex-Somali FIFA Official]; see BENSINGER, supra note 2, at 32 ("Blatter and
Bin Hammam sued the Simali for libel, then dragged him before the FIFA disciplinary
committee, where he was banned from the sport for two years for failing to provide
enough evidence to support his accusations.").
325. Ex-Somali FIFA Official, supra note 322.
326. CONN, supra note 39, at 282; GARCIA REPORT, supra note 313, at 260.
327. CONN, supra note 39, at 282.
328. GARCIA REPORT, supra note 313, at 260-61
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disowned by people who once called themselves friends; we've been attacked
personally, professionally and in cyberspace; we've been threatened; the same
organizations that we once worked so diligently and loyally for have disparaged
and demeaned us, campaigned against us and tried to rob us of our dignity and
32 9
respect; our self-esteem, confidence, resolve and resilience have been tested.

As Mersiades explained, "we feel that we've done our fair share of the
330
heavy lifting" in pursuit of FIFA reform.
Moreover, both Almajid and Mersiades claim that FIFA not-sosubtly retaliated against them by failing to preserve their
confidentiality when Hans-Joachim Eckert initially released a
summary of the Garcia Report that "effectively identified them," which
3 31
allegedly violated Rule 16.1 of the FIFA Ethics Committee Code.
Mersiades stated that Eckert's summary was a "deliberate denigration
332
of two women who have been courageous enough to say something."
Observers said that "[r]ather than criticizing the corrupt officials of
FIFA and the bidders from Russia and Qatar, FIFA turned the report
into an attack on the whistleblowers."3 3 3 Mersiades noted that "the
practical fallout to being a whistleblower has been hard, as she feels
ostracized in her native Australia." 334 Almajid warned other potential
whistleblowers that
[w]hen it comes to FIFA, be prepared to be crucified,
and over again . . . Be prepared to suffer and pay for
never to feel safe again and never feel you can
importantly, be ready to be betrayed by those who
3 35
you.

not once or twice but over
your actions. Be prepared
trust anyone. But most
have promised to protect

329. MERSIADES, supra note 2, at 344.
330. Id.
331. Owen Gibson, Whistleblower PhaedraAlmajid hits back at Fifa's dismissalof
complaint, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/football/
2014/dec/16/whistleblower-phaedra-almajid-hits-back-fifa-confidentiality-complaint
[https://perma.cclV6Y5-AB94] (archived Feb. 8, 2019); see MERSIADES, supra note 2, at
322 ("Garcia chose to turn personal and play the woman, when he should have stuck
with the issues."); Gibson, Complaints, supra note 65; Paul Kelso, World Cup: Qatar
NEWS
(Nov.
17,
2014),
Complain
to
FIFA,
SKY
Whistleblowers
http://news.sky.com/story/world-cup-qatar-whistleblowers-complain-to-fifa-10382247
[https://perma.cc/WTQ2-68SG] (archived Feb. 8, 2019); Masters, supra note 65.
332. Nick Harris, FIFA whistleblowers break their silence: If you question
governing body, be prepared to be crucified, be prepared to be betrayed by those who
promised to protect you..., DAILY MAIL (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
sport/football/article-2836114/FIFA-whistleblowers-break-silence-question-governingbody-prepared-crucified.html [https://perma.cc/AVL6-MDR2] (archived Feb. 9, 2019).
333. Rick Cohen, Time to Praise Courageous Whistleblowers in FIFA Scandal,
NONPROFIT Q. (May 29, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/05/29/time-to-praisecourageous-whistleblowers-in-fifa-scandall [https://perma.cc5NFQ-78JX] (archived Feb.
9, 2019).
334. Id. (noting that "the involvement of the Australian senate, which is now
investigating the payment, offers some measure of protection to Mersiades and
reassurance she won't be harmed.").
335. Harris, supra note 332.
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The retaliation risk is particularly acute for rank-and-file
employees in the regional confederations. They are uniquely situated
to uncover instances of fraud and corruption, but at the same time
particularly vulnerable because they are far away from the power
center of FIFA in Switzerland. As Mary Papenfuss and Teri Thompson
explained:
Employees of CONCACAF's New York office suspected the Federation's financial
statements were crooked but felt powerless to act. "What do you do in that
situation? We couldn't very well report it to our bosses Chuck Blazer or Jack
Warner, who seemed to be orchestrating everything," one said. "So then what?
Do we call FIFA? Pick up the phone and talk to the FBI?"3 3 6

The problem, as they continued, is that "[w]histleblowers and
their supporters have traditionally been forced out at FIFA and its
federations."3 37 Even Blazer became a target after he blew the whistle
on Warner, with FIFA hiring an investigator, Simon Strong, to "dig up
dirt on Chuck Blazer."3 3 8
This has even extended to players who have called out their
leaders for corrupt dealings. Players on Trinidad and Tobago's historic
2006 World Cup team complained that Warner reneged on a deal to
share all profits equally between the players and the association.3 3 9
They went so far as to take their case to the Sport Dispute Resolution
Panel, which was created to arbitrate disputes involving UK athletes,
and later Trinidad's high court when Warner ignored the Dispute
Resolution Panel's ruling in favor of the athletes. 34 0 The players,
however, paid a deep price for their efforts, with Papenfuss and
Thompson reporting that "some were blacklisted and forced out of the
sport in their prime by Warner and his cronies." 341
FIFA's retaliation toward whistleblowers has not been reserved
for its own employees or people under its direct control. For example,
although we don't know whether the insider who leaked the documents
to Andrew Jennings was ever discovered or suffered repercussions,
Jennings himself was certainly punished for his efforts.34 2 He could not
be fired from FIFA since he was not an employee, but Jennings was
banned from FIFA proceedings starting in 2003, thereby cutting off his
routine access to FIFA officials. 34 3
Even outside of FIFA, retribution against football whistleblowers
is often quite open and deliberate. In Cyprus, for example, Spyros
Neofitides, the head of the Cypriot players' union, helped to expose
match fixing and illegal betting on games in the island's professional

336. PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 193.
337. Id.
338. BENSINGER, supra note 2, at 81.
339. PAPENFUSS & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 195-96.
340. Id. at 196.
341. Id.
342. See Odeven, supra note 301.
343. Id.
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leagues. 344 As thanks for his efforts, the Cyrpus Football Association
(CFA) accused him of slander and referred Neofitides to a CFA
disciplinary committee where he faced a minimum fine of C5,000 and
possible suspension. 345 Neofitides claims that the CFA doesn't "want
anyone to speak out about this issue," suggesting that "it's a threat
pure and simple. If players see this happening, how then will it be
34 6
possible for me to convince them to speak out about it?"
The most egregious example of retaliation allegedly suffered by a
football whistleblower involved South African politician Jimmy
Mohlala. He reported fraud relating to what he claimed was a forged
tax certificate that was crucial to obtaining land for the construction of
a stadium for the 2010 World Cup.34 7 After a police investigation led to
the suspension of several African National Congress politicians
implicated in the scheme, Mohlala was pressured to resign by the
ANC. 34 8 Refusing, he was killed by a masked gunman one day prior to
349
Prior
appearing in court to testify regarding the construction fraud.
"corrupt
that
her
told
husband
her
that
stated
had
widow
his
to this,
people wanted to kill him. He said that we must not go out in the car
at night."35 0 After his death, his widow reported that both she and their
son were tortured to try to get them to confess to ordering the hit
themselves.3 5 1
Cleaning house, so-to-speak, among FIFA leaders has done little
to change FIFA's view of whistleblowers. In 2016, after Gianni
Infantino took over the presidency, he came under fire for the use of
private aircraft and for spearheading a plot to remove Dominic Scala
352
The FIFA Ethics
after he refused Infantino's compensation request.

Committee had begun to consider whether to open an investigation
into potential violations of the Ethics Code, in part based on
information allegedly provided by the head of FIFA's travel

344. See Helena Smith, Car bombs, corruption and illegal betting-how football in
2016),
(Sept.
6,
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GUARDIAN
of
control,
sprialled
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Cyprus
https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2016/sep/06/bomb-attacks-and-boycotts[https://perma.ccl6NMJ-Y8XK]
how-football-corruption-in-cyprus-turned-nasty
(archived Feb. 9, 2019) (discussing football corruption in Cyprus).
345. Helena Smith, Cyprus match-fixing whistleblower faces C5,000 fine after
Guardianexposg, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
[https://perma.ccW8DVfootball/2016/sep/13/cyprus-match-fixing-coach-guardian-fine
SZRJ] (archived Feb. 9, 2019).
346. Id.
347. Jane Flanagan, 'My husband would still be alive today if it hadn't been for
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department, Severin Podolak, and the chief of staff for the FIFA
secretary-general, Christoph Schmidt.3 5 3 After the two whistleblowers
reported the potential ethics violations to the committee, though, they
were summarily dismissed by Infantino's hand-picked new secretarygeneral, Fatma Samoura, in what was characterized as a "purge by
Gianni Infantino's administration aimed at suppressing opposition to
his increasingly shaky presidency." 354
E. The Potentialfor Whistleblower Reform in FIFA
Despite FIFA's attitudes toward whistleblowers, or perhaps
because of it, whistleblowers must be part of any true solution to the
FIFA problem. As Michael Kohn, president of the National
Whistleblower Center, opined, "Don't expect 'accountability' to become
FIFA's talking point any time soon. In the final analysis, the hope of
true reform and accountability will be directly tied to the willingness
of whistleblowers to come forward as quickly as possible."3 5 5
FIFA itself recognized this when it created a hotline for reporting
abuses in 2013 as part of an update to its Code of Conduct and Code of
Ethics. 3 5 6 It does not appear, however, that anonymity is assured for

hotline users, let alone any protections offered if their identities are
disclosed.35 7 A reporting hotline without assurances of either
confidentiality or whistleblower protections is unlikely to be heavily
utilized, especially in an environment where there has historically
been distrust of whistleblowers. When discussing a similar proposed
reporting mechanism in the context of the 2010 World Cup in South
Africa, the Brookings Institution recommended that "[tlo promote and
protect impropriety reporting, FIFA and the host nation should have
in place stringent whistleblower protections."3 58
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This does not mean that devising a whistleblower program for
FIFA will be easy. It is a large, diverse, organization, with employees
operating around the globe in a variety of jurisdictions. Many of its
leaders, especially at the national level, are deeply entrenched and are
3 59
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including both suspensions and expulsions from the sport, as well as
possible financial penalties. 36 5 Whistleblowers would be protected as
long as they make reports in good faith based on their "honest belief"
in the information, which would help discourage "malicious
allegations," without chilling reports based on "mere suspicion" or
3 66
incomplete information.
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FIFA could also adopt proactive measures to incentivize
whistleblowing. For example, it could offer financial rewards for the
provision of information that leads to disciplinary sanctions. While
such bounties
could encourage false reports, they might
counterbalance the financial disincentive to report that already exists.
Furthermore, FIFA could ban contracts prohibiting the disclosure of
information about wrongdoing. It could even adopt a policy mandating
disclosure, much like policies that mandate that players and officials
must come forward if they have been approached about match fixing,
even if they rejected those advances. 36 7 That would have to be balanced
against the risk that such a system would drive corruption further
underground, though, by reducing the incentives of employees to be
vigilant.
Beyond adopting its own internal whistleblowing incentives and
protection, FIFA could go a step further and condition continued
participation in FIFA-sponsored competitions on the adoption of
similar programs by regional confederations, member associations,
and even the legal jurisdictions in which those organizations reside and
in which its major tournaments take place. Transparency
International recently developed a "best practices" guide for
whistleblowing legislation that could be used to help certify
compliance. 368 Given the patchwork and incomplete nature of
whistleblowing legislation in the EU and elsewhere, 36 9 a FIFA push for
reform could be the catalyst for beneficial change in more than just the
football industry.
A move to require adoption of whistleblower protection at the subFIFA level would not be as radical as it might seem, as several nations
and football associations who might otherwise have been considered
unlikely supporters of such initiatives have recently put programs in*
place. Saudi Arabia, for example, initiated an anti-corruption
campaign in late 2017 after reports of corruption and embezzlement.3 70
As part of this campaign, King Salman issued a royal decree for the
protection of whistleblowers.3 7 1 The decree stipulated that "the

*
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National Anti-Corruption Commission shall report entities that take
disciplinary action against employees or threaten their rights or job
3 72
benefits if they report corrupt practices to the commission."
The Ghana Football Association (GFA) went a step further to
encourage whistleblowers. It announced that it would be offering
30,000 Ghanaian Cedis "to any whistleblower who has credible
373
information of corrupt practices of bribery and related accusations."
374
Although this program was criticized as being merely symbolic,
providing such incentives may be an important part of a cultural shift
that federations can help to foster where the traditional resistance to
whistleblowing is deep seated.
FIFA could also enlist help from a number of organizations
currently developing whistleblower programs or use existing programs
as a template. The Foundation for Sports Integrity recently announced
during a conference on FIFA reform that it intended to collaborate with
other organizations to "spearhead initiatives to protect whistle-blowers
3 75
More
and support their receipt of legal and financial support."
Development
and
Co-operation
Economic
of
the
Organisation
broadly,
(OECD) issued a report in 2016 calling for greater whistleblower
protection in the private sector, both in the internal procedures of
companies and in the laws of OECD countries. 37 6 As more FIFA
member nations become subject to comprehensive whistleblower
requirements, the traditional resistance to it in FIFA may inevitably
decline.

V.

CONCLUSION

This may be a particularly appropriate time for FIFA to adopt a
comprehensive whistleblower program. The fateful decision to award
what has been described as the "scandal-ridden" 2018 and 2022 World
Cups to Russia and Qatar, respectively, is one of the actions most
377
closely identified with FIFA corruption in recent investigations.
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Even now, new revelations are emerging. Russian whistleblower
Grigory Rodchenkov's lawyer accused FIFA of "sweeping Russia's
doping fraud under the carpet" after it closed an investigation into
suspected doping involving the Russian World Cup team.3 7 8 Australian

whistleblower Bonita Mersiades claims that Qatar's state-owned TV
company, beIN Sports, then known as Al Jazeera, agreed to pay $100
million on the condition that Qatar was awarded the 2022 World
Cup.3 79 Moreover, both Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch have issued reports about the abuse of foreign workers involved
in the construction of stadiums in each country in preparation for their
respective World Cups.3 8 0

At the same time, whistleblower retaliation has been a serious
concern in both countries. As discussed previously, Phaedra Almajid
reported that her life was in danger after her identity as the
whistleblower on the Qatar 2022 World Cup bid was effectively
revealed when a summary of the Garcia Report was released.38 1 More
recently, Yuliya Stepanova, a member of the Russian track and field
team, revealed that she was similarly threatened. Stepanova blew the
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whistle on extensive doping in her country's team along with her
38 2
husband, who worked for the country's anti-doping authority.
Notwithstanding her action to report the doping, she was denied a spot
3 83
in the 2016 Rio Olympics by the International Olympics Committee.
She and her husband were also forced to flee the country and
subsequently claimed that their lives were at risk because of threats of
Russian reprisals. 3 84 This all occurred despite having the support of
her sport's organizing body, the International Association of Athletic
3 85
As the chief
Federations, and the World Anti-Doping Agency.
this will
remarked,
Agency
Anti-Doping
U.S.
the
of
executive
386
future."
the
in
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deter
"undoubtedly
The fact that FIFA has survived and popular interest remained
high in the 2018 World Cup is perhaps the most important reason to
pursue whistleblower reform at this time. For many, global football is
a mission more than it is a business. This kind of loyalty to that mission
is the seed upon which reform can be sown. Outsiders have the benefit
of being disinterested and disconnected, but without the dedication to
FIFA's original mission possessed by some insiders, they may be more
easily corrupted once they are working for the organization. Although
it is encouraging that whistleblowers have come forward despite the
very real threat of personal and professional sacrifice, FIFA cannot
count on that kind of selfless determination to continue. FIFA's culture
of corruption is longstanding, and in the absence of continued pressure,
it will only grow stronger. If there is any hope to transform this culture,
it is likely to come from the insiders who are passionate and dedicated
to the game and FIFA's original mission.
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